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Case No. 20140749-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for murder, a first degree felony, 
and obstructing justice, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
At 10:20 a.m. on June 5, 2011, Defendant made an anonymous 911 call 
from Angela Jen.kin's apartment and reported that a wmnan was not 
breathing. Defendant did not rnention that the woman, Angela, had 
stopped breathing two hours earlier. Nor did he mention that Angela had 
stopped breathing because he strangled her. Rather, Defendant hung up 
the phone, left the aparhnent door slightly ajar, and fled. 
Minutes later, police opened Angela's door to find her body in a state 
of rigor mortis on the floor by her bed. Her face was swollen and purple 
with bruises. She also had bruises all over her body, a broken nose, seven 
broken ribs, and lips torn from her gums. Police found damp bloody 
towels, smudges on the bedroom walls where blood had been wiped away, 
and signs of blood wiped off the bathroom sink, tub, and floor. 
Three hours later, police tracked Defendant down at a friend's house. 
In the police interview that followed, Defendant admitted that he had 
punched, slapped, kicked, and strangled Angela for several hours before 
she died. According to Defendant, Angela bled a lot, and the bloody towels 
and blood in the bathroom were from his attempts to stop the bleeding. 
Defendant claimed that after strangling Angela for the last time, he fell 
asleep for two hours. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. At trial, Detective Reyes testified without objection to the 
ad1nissions Defendant made in his police interview. On cross, Defendant 
tried to elicit his hearsay explanation for why he had attacked Angela- that 
she had repeatedly told him she was having an affair with his brother. 
Defendant argued that his explanation was admissible under rule 106, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, to clarify his admissions and to support his otherwise 
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unsupported extreme emotional distress mitigation defense. The trial court 
excluded the explanation as self-serving and unreliable hearsay that fell 
outside the scope of rule 106. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's 
self-serving hearsay explanation for why he killed his girlfriend was not 
admissible under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling under 
rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, for abuse of discretion. See State v. Jones, 
2015 UT 19, ,r,r12, 36-42, 345 P.3d 1195. 
2. Was evidence that Defendant tried to clean up the blood in the 
murder victim's apartment sufficient to support his obstructing justice 
conviction? 
Standard of Review. In sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, this 
Court views all "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 
46, ~177, 299 P.3d 892 (citation omitted). This Court "will not reverse a jury 
verdict" so long as "some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the ele1nents of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendu1n A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2009) (murder); 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-205.5 (West Supp. 2009 (special mitigation); 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-306 (West Supp. 2009) (obstructing justice); 
Utah R. Evid. 106. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Mary Alice White lived with her 1nother in a second-floor apartment 
in Millcreek. R748:45,56-57. Angela Jenkins, Defendant's girlfriend, lived 
directly above them. R748:46,57;R749:74. 
On May 4, 2011, Mary retired to her bedroom soon after 11:00 p.m. 
R748:46. Almost immediately, Mary heard noise and walking around 
upstairs. R748:46-47,51. Then, it sounded like the people upstairs were 
having sex. R748:47,53. 
Around 1:00 a.in., the sounds upstairs changed. R748:48,51. Mary 
heard pounding, 11 some muffled yelling, some grunting, and then smne 
running around here and there." R748:48,51,53. She also heard II a lot of 
crying, 1nore so like despair." R748:48,51,53. The person yelling was am.an, 
although Mary could not make out what he was yelling. R748:48. "The 
crying was definitely a female." R748:49. 
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Although Mary tried to fall asleep, "the noise was so loud from 
upstairs" that she couldn't. R748:49,58. Finally, between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 
a.m., Mary woke up her mother Blenda and asked her to call the police. 
R748:49-50. 
Instead, Benda waited, listening to the noise for about two hours. 
Then, Blenda heard "a boom, boom, boom, boom, oooh, oooh" that scared 
her. R748:57-59. She tried to call Angela several times. R748:57-59. When 
no one answered, Blenda went upstairs and knocked on Angela's door, 
again to no avail. R748:60. After repeating that process several times-
calling Angela and then going upstairs and knocking on her door- Blenda 
knew "something" was "wrong." At 5:49 a.m., Blenda finally called 911. 
R748:62,64,124. The noise from upstairs continued for another 30 minutes 
before it got a little quiet. R748:62-63. 
Around 6:35 a.m., Officers Alan Morley and Ronnie Prescott were 
dispatched to Angela Jenkins' apartment on an "active domestic dispute." 
R748:68. When they arrived at Angela's door about five minutes later, they 
listened for sound, but it was very quiet. R748:71. Morley knocked on the 
locked door several tiines- each tiine louder- but no one answered. 
R748:71.,73,77. Telephone calls to Angela's number went to voice mail. 
R7488:72. Morley cleared the call and left around 7:00 a.m. R748:75. 
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Although there was a brief period of silence upstairs, Mary heard 
noise almost until she left for work. R748:55. By the time she left at 8:15 
a.m., however, "it was dead silent." R748:55. 
About 10:00 a.m., Defendai:t called his friend Roger Gary Warner 
from Angela's aparbnent and asked Roger to pick him up. R748:90-
92;R749:92,98. Twenty minutes later, Defendant made an anonymous 911 
call from Angela's aparbnent and said that he needed an ambulance 
because a woman wasn't breathing. R748:126-27,130,134. Defendant hung 
up, left the door to Angela's apartment slightly ajar, and met Roger in the 
parking lot. R748:76,94;R749:13. Defendant again called 911 anonymously 
about five minutes later from a 7-Eleven across the street from Angela's 
aparbnent. R748:100-01,131. After briefly stopping at an ex-girlfriend's 
house, Defendant went to Roger's home. R748:101. On the way there, 
Defendant told Roger that he thought he might have killed Angela. 
R748:97. At Roger's house, Defendant took off his bloody pants and socks 
and took a nap. R748:102. 
The fire department, ambulance, and Officers Morley and Prescott 
arrived at Angela's apartment within minutes of Defendant's 911 calls. 
R748:141. Finding the door ajar this time, the officers a1mounced 
themselves and went inside. R7 48:79. In the living room, they found a 
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pillow with what appeared to be blood on it. R748:79;R749:15. In a back 
bedroom, they found blood spatter on the wall and Angela, partially 
clothed and badly beaten, lying on the floor by the bed. R748:79-80,143. 
Fire medics confirmed that Angela was dead. R748:83,143. They saw 
"obvious signs of rigor mortis" -the stiffening of muscles that slowly 
begins after death. R748:143.159,160. One of those signs-one of Angela's 
arms was "independently staying up" -indicated that she had died at least 
two hours earlier and that either she or something around her had been 
moved since her death. R748:143.159,160;R749:16-17. 
Officers found a pink bag in the kitchen sink and another near 
Angela's body. R749:15. They found a hole in the sheetrock over the bed 
that "looked like something had gone through [it] a couple of times." 
R749:17,24. They also found in the bedroon1 a pillowcase that "had quite a 
bit of blood on it," several blood spots on the mattress, and "quite a bit" of 
blood splatter on the wall. R749:17. 
The color of the blood on the wall "see1ned a little off," like it had 
been diluted. R749:17,21,23. The light switch also seemed to have diluted 
blood on it. R749:18. Police found "a lot" of bloody clothes and towels 
piled up in the hamper that looked like they had been saturated with water. 
R749:17-18,21. Near Angela's legs, they found wadded-up bloody and very 
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wet gauze, a bottle of peroxide and a spray bottle of antiseptic, and a pink 
hospital wash basin with blood in it. R749:18-20,22,28. 
In Angela's bathroom, police found signs of blood in both the sink 
and bathtub. R749:32-33. In addition, it looked like someone had tried to 
wipe blood off the floor, vanity, and bathtub. R749:34-35,37-38. 
Defendant's confession. By about noon, officers h·acked Defendant 
down at Roger's house, although no one responded to their beating on the 
door, screaming, and using a loud speaker for an hour and a half. 
R748:104;R749:4-6. Finally, Roger left the house around 1:30 p.m. R749:6. 
He told police that his intent was to lead the police away from the house 
and then talk Defendant into meeting Roger later so that Defendant could 
turn himself in. R749:121. 
It took negotiators another two hours to convince Defendant to come 
out. R749:6. When he did, he was not wearing either pants or socks. 
R749:9. Police recovered his blood-stained pants and socks later from 
Roger's house. R749:7. 
Because Defendant told police that he had ingested 17 methadone 
pills, police took him to a hospital for treatment. R749:119. Defendant was 
also treated for a broken finger, which Defendant said he broke by 
punching the wall. R749:90. 
-8-
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Detective Reyes interviewed Defendant a few hours after his arrest. 
R749:120. Defendant said that he and Angela had been in a relationship for 
about six months. R749:94. Defendant admitted having a fight with Angela 
the night before, where he "slapped her" and "thumped her." R749:81-82. 
Defendant acknowledged "that it went farther than it should have." 
R749:81-82. Defendant said that the fight began when he "got mad at" 
Angela," and that he "pulled her hair," "slapped her," "choked her a little 
bit," and that "it was over from there." R749:82-83. 
But then, Defendant admitted to kicking Angela with the heel of his 
foot near her hip area and possibly her shoulder and to stomping on her 
thigh. R749:87-88. He also admitted biting Angela's arm and possibly 
somewhere else. R749:88. And he admitted to grabbing her stomach and 
"clenching or pinching and pulling" her there. R7 49:88. 
Defendant admitted too that he "grabbed" Angela's lips "with his 
hands and pulled them down and to the side," which "caused the tearing." 
R749:89,96. Although Defendant clailned that he hit Angela only once with 
a closed fist, he ad1nitted that he "repeatedly slapped her back and forth" 
and "backhanded her," which he said hurt her nose. R749:89. 
Defendant said that the assault lasted "probably a couple of hours," 
beginning the night before and ending "about eight or nine in the morning." 
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R749:90-91. He said that Angela fought back '' a little bit, ... but not 1nuch 
because she's a woman." R749:91. 
Defendant said that Angela "lost consciousness" a couple of times 
and that he h~ied to revive her II on a couple occasions by breathing for her." 
R749:86,91. Defendant said that he used Peroxide on Angela's face to help 
stop the profuse bleeding and to clean her up. R749:91,95-96. He also said 
that he took Angela, who weighed 216 pounds, 11 to the bathtub" and "put 
her head under the water." R748:174;R749:91,95-96. 
Defendant said that Angela lost consciousness for the last time when 
he strangled her around 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning. R749:92. Defendant 
said that "he got her in a headlock at one point," but that "wasn't really 
having much effect." R749:97. Then, "with Angela lying on her back, and 
on the floor, he got on top of her and placed his elbow in her throat," but 
that also "wasn't having much effect." Id. So Defendant "used his 
forearm," "placed it across the front of her neck," and "leaned into her as 
she was lying in her back." Id. Angela "was just screaming." R749:90. 
Then, she blacked out and never regained consciousness. R749:97-98. 
According to Defendant, he then lay down with Angela "and took a 
nap." R749:92,98. When he awoke and could not arouse Angela, Defendant 
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called Roger and then 911. R749:92,98. Defendant said that he left the 
house because Angela was not responding and he was scared. R749:92-93 . 
. When asked why he had assaulted Angela, Defendant said he got 
mad because "he thought" Angela "was cheating on him" with his brother 
and "this enraged hhn," that Angela "admitted it and she kept saying it," 
and that when Defendant asked Angela to tell him she would stop, she 
"wouldn't tell me that" and "that hurt my feelings." R749:166-68. 
The autopsy. The medical examiner, Dr. Todd Grey, autopsied 
Angela's body the next day. R748:155. For many autopsies, Dr. Grey needs 
only one sheet of paper with a body outline to record a person's injuries. 
R748:172. For Angela, he needed five sheets. R748:172. 
One of the first things Dr. Grey noticed was that "because she had 
bled so much into her tissues" and "may have bled fairly extensive 
externally as well," Angela had very little lividity- the pooling of blood 
along gravity lines that normally occurs with death. R748:157-58. 
Dr. Grey was most struck by the injuries to Angela's face, which were 
consistent with someone beating her with his hands and feet. R748:168. Dr. 
Grey found deep red bruising and swelling "essentially everywhere." 
R748:163-64. He found scraping across her forehead, hemorrhaging in the 
whites of her eyes, and a cut and fractured nose. R748:165. He found 
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bruising on Angela's chin, the inner surfaces of her scalp, and her brain. 
R748:167. Finally, Dr. Grey found tears of the inner surfaces on both 
Angela's upper and lower lips - 11 as if the lip had been pulled away from 
the gum" -which "would've bled fairly significantly." R748:165-66. 
Dr. Grey also found substantial injuries to Angela's neck consistent 
with manual strangulation. R748:170-72. Specifically, he found diffused 
bruising "all across the front and sides" of Angela's upper neck. R748:169. 
He also found hemorrhaging in the main muscle that turns the neck and the 
deeper muscles surrounding the Ada1n's apple. R748:169. 
Next, Dr. Grey found "extensive" bruises-"too numerous to count-
on Angela's torso, abdomen, thighs, knees, shins, arms, hands, and 
buttocks. R748:172-73,178-80. To the extent there was any pattern in the 
bruises, Dr. Gray saw "lots of sort of distinct oval bruises grouped 
together," possibly caused by knuckles or some type of pinching. R748:173. 
A particularly large bruise across the left thigh was consistent with being 
kicked or stomped on. R748:178. 
Dr. Grey also noted diffuse bruising on Angela's left forearm and 
hand that went" all the way around." R748:179. And he noted what looked 
like bite marks on Angela's right back and right buttock. R748:179. 
-12-
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Finally, Dr. Grey found eight fractured ribs, five on the right side and 
three on the left. R748:176. All the fractures "had bleeding associated with 
them." R748:176. 
Dr. Grey testified that although Angela was on several prescribed 
medications, her system had scant amounts of them. R748:183-84. Angela's 
system had a more significant amount of methadone, but because she had 
been prescribed methadone "fairly regularly" for years, Dr. Grey concluded 
that the methadone did not contribute to her death. R748:185,187,196-97. 
Dr. Grey concluded that Angela died from multiple intentionally-
inflicted blunt force injuries and strangulation. He further concluded that 
either the blunt force injuries or the strangulation could have been lethal on 
their own. R748:157,189,192. 
D.N.A. testing. Police sent several items for DNA testing-including 
a pillow case, Defendant's pants, a swab from Angela's bathroom, and a 
swab from Defendant's inner ear. R749:49-50. Blood from the pillow case 
contained both Defendant's and Angela's DNA. R749:55-56. Angela was 
the major contributor of the blood in Defendant's pants and the blood swab 
taken from her bathtub. R749:60,63. Angela was also a contributor to the 
blood found in Defendant's inner ear. R749:61. 
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B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first degree 
felony, and one count of obstructing justice, a second degree felony. Rl-3. 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant unsuccessfully for a 
directed verdict on the obstructing justice charge. R750:35-36,38. The jury 
convicted Defendant as charged. R642. 
The h·ial court sentenced Defendant to 15-years-to-life on the murder 
conviction and one-year-to-fifteen-years on the obstructing justice 
conviction. R726-27. The court ordered that the sentences run concurrent to 
each other but consecutive to sentences Defendant was already serving for 
his prior aggravated kidnapping and assault of Angela. R726-27. 1 
Defendant timely appealed. R728. 
transferred the appeal to this Court. R740-41. 
The Utah Supreme Court 
1 Before Defendant's trial in this case, Defendant was convicted of 
aggravated kidnapping and assault with substantial bodily injury in 
connection with his assault of Angela two weeks before he murdered her. 
See State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, 344 P.3d 191. In that case, Defendant 
got mad at Angela after she said that his friend could not stay over. Id. ,r2. 
Defendant then hit Angela, bit her on the face, pulled her hair, and nearly 
bit her ear off. Id. When Angela escaped her aparhnent, Defendant 
dragged her 58 feet back to the apartment and closed her in it; a neighbor 
then heard what he thought was Defendant slamming Angela's her head 
into the wall. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant argues that the h·ial court cmrunitted reversible 
error when it allowed Detective Reyes to testify to Defendant's admissions 
about assaulting Angela, but prevented him from eliciting his explanation 
for why he assaulted Angela. Although Defendant acknowledges that his 
explanation for the assault was hearsay, he argues that it was admissible 
under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, to support his extreme emotional 
distress mitigation defense and to explain his other admissions. Defendant 
argues that the alleged error was prejudicial because it violated his right to 
present his theory of the case to the jury. 
Defendant's argument fails because whether or not the trial court's 
ruling was erroneous, the court's ruling did not preclude Defendant from 
presenting his defense. The ruling 1nerely required Defendant to present 
his defense through other available means-i.e., his testimony. 
Defendant's argument also fails because the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion. First, rule 106 does not overcmne the proscription against 
inad1nissible hearsay. Rule 106 allows the admission of additional portions 
of a writing recorded statement when - "in fairness" - those portions are 
necessary to explain or give context to otherwise misleading portions of the 
writing already ad1nitted. But nothing in rule 106 renders otherwise 
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inadmissible hearsay admissible. Second, Defendant has not shown that 
Detective Reyes' testimony about Defendant's admissions was misleading. 
Thus, he cannot show why his self-serving after-the-fact hearsay 
explanation was necessary .(fin fairness" to clarify Detective Reyes' 
testimony. 
But even if the trial court did err, Defendant cannot show prejudice. 
Indeed, given the evidence in this case- including the length and brutality 
of Defendant's attack on Angela and Defendant's conduct thereafter-any 
error in excluding Defendant's unreliable hearsay was harmless. 
Point II. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his conviction for obstructing justice. To convict Defendant of 
obsh·ucting justice, the State had to prove that Defendant (1) altered, 
destroyed, concealed, or removed any iten1 or other thing (2) with the intent 
to hinder, delay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment (3) regarding conduct that constitutes a first 
degree felony, in this case murder. 
Here, the State presented evidence that Defendant brutally attacked 
Angela over some seven hours; that she lost consciousness several tilnes 
during the attack; that Defendant did not respond to attempts to contact 
Angela during the attack; that Angela died at least two hours before 
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Defendant called 911; that Defendant moved her or something around her 
after she died; that Defendant not only cleaned blood off Angela but also 
tried to clean blood off her bedroom walls and the bathroom floor, vanity, 
and tub; that Defendant anonymously called 911; that Defendant fled; and 
that it took police some six hours to lure him out of his friend's house once 
they found him. 
All this evidence supports a reasonable inference that Defendant not 
only knew that he had killed Angela, but that either while she was dying or 
after she had died, Defendant intentionally destroyed some of the blood 
evidence to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S SELF-SERVING 
HEARSAY EXPLANATION FOR WHY HE KILLED HIS 
GIRLFRIEND WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 106, 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
As relevant here, Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
when a party introduces part of a writing or recorded statement, the 
opposing party may seek introduction of another part "which ought in 
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred under rule 106 when, after 
allowing Detective Reyes to present his admissions to brutally assaulting 
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Angela, it precluded him from eliciting on cross-examination the self-
serving explanation he had given police for the assault-Le., that Angela 
repeatedly told hhn she was having an affair with his brother and that, 
despite his requests, she had refused to end the affair. Aplt.Br. 14. 
Defendant acknowledges that his explanation to police was hearsay. Id. 9. 
He asserts that it was nonetheless admissible under rule 106 because it was 
'"relevant"' to his exh·eme emotional distress mitigation defense and 
'"necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context"' his admissions. Id. 14 
(citation omitted). Defendant concludes that its exclusion was prejudicial 
because it violated his due process right to present his theory of the case. 
Defendant's constitutional contention fails at the outset because the 
trial court's ruling did not deny him the opportunity to present an extreme 
en1otional dish·ess mitigation defense. To the contrary, Defendant always 
had the option to present his defense by taking the stand. 
Defendant's argument, therefore, is limited to whether the h·ial court 
erred under rule 106. It did not. First, nu1nerous courts have held that rule 
106 does not allow the adn1ission of a defendant's self-serving and 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay. Their reasoning is sound, and this Court 
should adopt it. 
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Second, even if rule 106 allowed the admission of self-serving hearsay 
under certain limited circumstances, such hearsay is admissible only when 
necessary "in fairness" to explain, clarify, or put in context statements 
already admitted that would otherwise be misleadmg. Here, Defendant's 
self-serving hearsay statements were not necessary to clarify misleading 
testimony concerning his admissions to brutally attacking Angela. 
Defendant sought admission of those statements only to minimize his 
culpability for the brutal attack by providmg an after-the-fact explanation-
that could not be challenged through cross-examination-for why he did it. 
Under such circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that rule 106 did not require admitting Defendant's self-serving 
statements. 
Finally, Defendant cannot show prejudice. Given the evidence in this 
case, any error in not ad1nitting Defendant's unreliable hearsay was 
harmless. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to 
deny any request by Defendant to elicit his hearsay state1nents to Detective 
Reyes about why he assaulted Angela. R298-303. Defendant moved under 
rule 412, Utah Rules of Evidence, to ad1nit evidence of Angela's sexual 
-19-
history to support an anticipated exh·eme emotional distress mitigation 
defense that Defendant assaulted Angela only after she repeatedly told him 
that she was having an affair with his brother. R747:2-3;R.184-88,331-32,345-
48. 
On the first day of trial before jury voir dire, the trial court struck the 
State's motion in limine as untimely. R747:3. The court also denied 
Defendant's rule 412 motion. Id. Defense counsel asked whether the court's 
ruling meant that he could not elicit evidence that he 0 believed that Angela 
... had sexual relations with his brother." Id. The trial court clarified that 
"[i]f [Defendant] testifies that he believed that she had had sex with his 
brother, ... he can give that testimony." R747:4. But when defense counsel 
suggested that he intended to elicit the evidence through other witnesses, 
the court responded, "that depends" on whether the evidence would be 
"admissible under the rules of evidence." R747:4. The State stated that if 
Defendant tried to present that evidence through Detective Reyes, the State 
would object to the evidence as "inappropriate hearsay." R747:8-9. The 
parties then stipulated that the State would not use evidence of Defendant's 
prior dmnestic violence against the victim in its case-in-chief unless the 
defense opened the door to the evidence. R747:18-19. 2 
2 See State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27,344 P.3d 191; see also fn.l supra. 
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In opening statement, the State outlined the evidence it intended to 
present to support the charges, including Defendant's extensive admissions 
to Detective Reyes. R747:30-42. The defense responded that it intended to 
show that Defendant assaulted Angela while experiencing extreme 
emotional distress after learning that she "had had sexual relations with his 
brother." R747:43. 
On direct, Detective Reyes testified to Defendant's admissions 
concerning his conduct during the assault. R149:78-116. On cross, 
Defendant tried to elicit his after-the-fact explanation for the assault-that 
Angela told him she was having an affair with his brother. R749:124. The 
State objected that the explanation was inadmissible hearsay. R749:124-25. 3 
In bench conference, the court ruled that it was Defendant's burden to 
prove exh·eme emotional distress mitigation by a preponderance and that 
the supporting evidence had to be admissible. R749:132. The court also 
ruled that if counsel was seeking to introduce hearsay, "unless you can give 
me an exception, it's not coming in." R749:127. The court tentatively 
sustained the State's objection pending further discussion. R7 49:127-29. 
3 Transcripts of Detective Reyes' testimony and discussion concerning 
the State's objection are attached at Addendum B. 
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At the next recess, the trial court let defense counsel examine 
Detective Reyes to make a record of the evidence Defendant sought to have 
admitted. Reyes testified that Defendant said that he assaulted Angela 
because he got mad. R749:150. Reyes testified that Defendant said he got 
mad because "he thought" Angela "was cheating on him" with his brother 
and "this enraged him." Defendant told Reyes that Angela "admitted it and 
she kept saying it," and that when Defendant asked her to tell him she 
would stop, Angela "wouldn't tell me that" and "that hurt my feelings." 
R749:166-68. 
Defendant then asserted five grounds on which these hearsay 
statements were ad1nissible through Detective Reyes: (1) under the 
confrontation clause; (2) under rule 106, the rule of completeness; (3) to 
show bias; ( 4) they were not hearsay because they were not offered for the 
truth of whether Angela was cheating on him, "but to explain his conduct"; 
and (5) to show Defendant's state of mind and motive. R749:164; R750:5. 
After releasing the jury for the day, the court stated that it would research 
and consider the issue overnight. R749:170-73. 
The next morning, the trial court ruled that none of Defendant's 
grounds supported introducing his hearsay state1nents through Detective 
Reyes. R750:5. The court rejected Defendant's confrontation clause 
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argument because "[t]o the extent he is seeking to elicit his own exculpatory 
statements through the detective, on its face it is clear that his statements are 
not the statements of a witness against him." R750:6. The court rejected 
Defendant's bias argument because the defense had pointed to nothing in 
Detective Reyes' testimony that suggested bias or anything other "than a 
straightforward response to [the parties'] questions." R750:9. The court 
rejected Defendant's argu1nent that the statement was not being offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted because if it were so, Defendant had failed 
"to articulate its relevance." R750:10. The court rejected Defendant's 
"motive" argument because "the statement is an after-the-fact explanation 
that seeks to minimize his culpability for his admitted conduct towards the 
victim" and Defendant had not shown that it was made "under 
circumstances that indicate its reliability and trustworthiness." R750:10-12. 
Finally, in rejecting Defendant's rule 106 argument, the court noted 
that under rule 106, it "1nust apply a fairness standard" and that it need 
"admit only those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, 
or place into context the portion that has already been inh·oduced." R750:7. 
The court noted that here, "defendant seeks to ad1nit state1nents that are 
essentially a self-serving, after-the-fact explanation for his conduct in 
assaulting the victim, and that portion of the overall interview was 
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temporally removed from the inculpatory statements that had been received 
without objection." R750:8. The court then ruled "that the fairness analysis 
does not require the admission of the state1nents offered to explain the 
reasons for his brutal assault on the victim." R750:8. 
The court concluded by observing that it was "not sure that the 
defense has really thought through the potential implications had I ruled 
the other way. Had those statements been introduced, it would certainly 
open the door" for the State "to then put on all of the evidence of the 
defendant's prior convictions for his assaultive behavior on the very same 
victim just a few weeks prior, which would've totally undercut" 
Defendant's exb·eme emotional disb·ess defense "that this was an out of 
character, extreme, overwrought, emotional response to a triggering event." 
R750:12-13. 
In light of the trial court's ruling, defense counsel agreed that the 
record lacked any basis for an extreme emotional distress jury instruction. 
R750:13. 
B. The trial court's ruling did not deprive Defendant of his right 
to present a complete defense. 
Defendant's argurnent is pren-dsed on the assumption that tlle trial 
court's ruling denied him his due process right to present his theory of the 
case. See Aplt.Br. 14,17 (asserting that his hearsay statements were 
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"relevant" to his extreme emotional distress mitigation defense). Defendant 
then argues that because the ruling was erroneous and violated his 
constitutional right to present a defense, the State must show that the 
court's ruling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 17. 
Defendant's claim fails at the outset because the trial court's exclusion 
of his hearsay did not deny him the opportunity to present an extreme 
emotional distress mitigation defense. To the contrary, Defendant always 
had the choice to present that mitigation defense by taking the stand and 
testifying. 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recognized this in State v. Cruz-Meza, 
2003 UT 32, 76 P.3d 1165. After murdering his girlfriend, Cruz-Meza 
admitted to a friend that he had committed the murder, but claimed that he 
did so only because she refused to let him visit his son and then pointed a 
gun at him. Id. at ,I,I2,4. The trial court ruled that Cruz-Meza's oral 
explanation to his friend was unh·ustworthy and umeliable and thus 
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inadmissible to support an extreme emotional distress mitigation defense. 
Id. at if 6. 4 
Like Defendant here, Cruz-Meza argued that "by excluding the 
statements in question, the h·ial court deprived [him] of the opportunity to 
present evidence supporting a defense of extreme emotional distress 
without taking the witness stand and waiving his privilege against self-
incrimination." Id. at ljf16. That choice, Cruz-Meza argued, violated his 
right to due process. Id. 
The supreme court held that Cruz-Meza's argument was "without 
merit." Id. at if 16. The court noted that "' the completeness doctrine is not 
cmnpelled by the Constitution."' Id. at ljf17 (quoting 21 Charles Alan Wright 
& Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure,§ 5077 (1977)). The 
court also noted that '"[n]either the Constitution nor Rule 106 ... requires 
the admission of the entire staten1ent once any portion is admitted in a 
4 Cruz-Meza brought his clailn under the common law rule of 
cmnpleteness, which required adn1ission of a con1plete statement whenever 
part of it was inh·oduced. See Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ljf9. That rule has 
been supplanted by rule 106 as far as writings or recorded state1nents go. 
ld. Cruz-Meza's statements, however, were oral; thus, Cruz-Meza argued 
that they should have been adn1itted under the cmnmon law rule. Id. at if 7. 
The Utah Suprern.e Court agreed with Cruz-Meza "that the rule of 
completeness 1nay be applied to oral statements through rule 611, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, which requires trial courts to "1nake the presentation of 
evidence 'effective for the ascertainment of the h·uth."' Id. at ,110 ( quoting 
Utah R. Evid. 611(a)). 
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criminal prosecution."' Id. (quoting United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 729 
(5th Cir. 1006)). The court then noted "that the fairness and trustworthiness 
tests are more than adequate to address any constitutional concerns with 
selective admission of oral statements by criminal defendants." Id. The 
court concluded: "Despite the difficulty in making a decision about 
whether to testify in his own defense, the fact remains that Cruz-Meza was 
entirely free to choose-the trial court's ruling excluding evidence did not 
compel him to testify." Id. 
Thus, under Cruz-Meza, excluding a defendant's exculpatory hearsay 
statements does not deprive a defendant of his right to present a defense. 
Rather, at 1nost, it requires a defendant to make the difficult decision about 
whether to testify in support of it. Compare State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 
215, 1if 59, 335 P.3d 900 (holding that erroneous exclusion of out-of-court 
statements made by people other than defendant-and thus to which 
defendant could not testify--deprived defendant of meaningful opportunity 
to present defense). 
Defendant's contention that the h·ial court's ruling violated his due 
process right to present a defense, therefore, fails. Consequently, Defendant 
can prevail on appeal only if he can show both that the h·ial court abused its 
discretion by excluding his hearsay state1nents and that he was prejudiced 
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by that error, i.e., that there is a "reasonable likelihood that it affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ,r,r33, 40, 784 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 38 (holding that failure to give lesser offense instruction is "'not 
harmful unless there is a reasonable likelihood" of a different result absent 
the error) (citation omitted). 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
Defendant's self-serving hearsay under rule 106. 
Defendant challenge only the trial court's ruling under rule 106 fails. 
The common law doctrine or rule of completeness "generally 
provides that a party may introduce the whole of a statement if any part is 
introduced by the opposing party." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,I9, 76 
P.3d 1165. Until the adoption of uniform evidentiary rules, Utah recognized 
this common law doctrine. See State v. Dunkley, 39 P.2d 1097, 1109 (Utah 
1935); State v. Martin, 300 P. 1034, 1038 (Utah 1931); see also Aplt.Br. 10,15 
(citing both cases). 
Today, rule 106 governs the admission of part or all of a written 
statement when one party admits another part of it: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is 
inh·oduced by a party, an adverse party may require the 
introduction at that ti111e of any other part or any other writing 
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or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered 
contemporaneously with it. 5 
By its plain language, therefore, Rule 106 "codifies" the common law rule of 
completeness only "in part." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19,140,345 P.3d 1195. 
Unlike the common law rule - and conh·ary to Defendant's 
contention, see Aplt.Br. 15-rule 106 does not require the wholesale 
admission of every written or recorded statement merely because an 
opposing party relied on some part of it. Rather, its "function" is only "to 
prevent a 'misleading impression created by taking matters out of context."' 
Jones, 2015 UT 19, ,r40 (quoting State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 144 n.6, 993 
P.2d 232); accord United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 669, 728 (5th Cir. 1006); 
United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1360 (D.C. 1986); United States v. Jamar, 
561 F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1977).6 Rule 106 thus requires only the 
admission of those additional portions of a writing II relevant and necessary 
to qualify, explain, or place into context" an otherwise misleading II portion 
already inh·oduced." Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if43 (quoting Branch, 91 F.3d 
5This Court has held that rule 106 also applies "to h·anscribed oral 
state1nents that are used extensivelv at trial." State v. Leleae, 1999 UT Aoo 
J • J. .L 
368, 'if 44 n.7, 993 P.2d 232. 
6Federal cases interpreting analogous evidentiary rules are persuasive 
guidance to Utah courts in interpreting state evidence rules. See Leleae, 1999 
UT App 368, 'if43 n.5. 
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at 728) (additional quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Jones, 2015 
UT 19, if40; State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,I14, 76 P.3d 1165. 
A trial court has II considerable discretion" under rule 106 11 in 
determining issues of fairness." Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if45; accord Jones, 
2015 UT 19, ,I42. 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion because rule 
106 does not render inadmissible hearsay admissible. 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court "has [yet] had the 
occasion to decide" whether evidence proffered under rule 106 must be 
otherwise admissible. See State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if41 & n.56, 345 P.3d 
195. For the reasons stated below, this Court should hold that evidence 
must be otherwise admissible and affirm the trial court. 
"Generally, out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted-hearsay- are not admissible." State v. Nguyen, 2011 UT A pp 2, 
,r10, 246 P.3d 535; see also Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (hearsay is any out-of-court 
statement that II a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement"); Utah R. Evid. 802 (hearsay "is not admissible 
except as provided by law or by these rules"). 
A declarant' s out-of-court inculpatory staterrLents are an exception. 
See Utah R. Evid. 801( d)(2) ( opposing party's statements not hearsay when 
offered against that party); Utah R. Evid. 804(3) ( exception to hearsay rule 
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for statements against a declarant's interests). This exception "is founded 
on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people 
who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements 
unless they believe them to be true." Williamson v. United States. 512 U.S. 
594, 599 (1994). Such statements, therefore, are deemed reliable enough to 
allow their admission without the safeguards applicable to "in court 
statements- the oath, the witness' awareness of the gravity of the 
proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness' demeanor, and, most 
importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine." Id. at 598. 
In conh·ast, a self-exculpatory out-of-court statement is "inherently 
unreliable," State v. Fernandez, 604 A.3d 1308, 1313 (Conn. App. 1992), 
because it has "nothing to guarantee its testimonial trustworthiness." State 
v. Brooks. 909 S.W.2d 854, 863 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. 1995) (citation omited). The 
"fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not 
make more credible the non-self-inculpatory parts." Williamson. 512 U.S. at 
599-600. This is because such statements" are not unambiguously adverse to 
the penal interest of the declarant,' but instead are likely to be attempts to 
minhnize the declarant's culpability."' Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 132 
(1999) ( explaining why defendant's statements inculpating co-defendant are 
generally inadmissible against co-defendant) ( emphasis in original). Such 
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statements, therefore, "are exactly the ones which people are 1nost likely to 
1nake even when they are false." Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599-600. 
Consequently, the hearsay rule requires that when "a party offers his 
own out-of-court declaration for its truth," that declaration "must satisfy the 
hearsay rule." Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 
742 (1996). Several courts have held that rule 106 does not alter that 
requirement. See, e.g., United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 
842 F.2d 1335, 1375-76 (2d Cir. 1988) (rule 106 "does not compel admission 
of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence"); United States v. Hassan, 7 42 
F.3d 104, 134 (4th Cir. 2014) (rule 106 '" does not render admissible ... 
evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules'") 
(citation omitted); United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir.1996) 
(rule 106 "does not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
evidence."). 
Otherwise, as these courts have explained, a criminal defendant 
"would be' able to place his exculpatory statements' before the jury without 
subjecting [himself] to cross-examination, precisely what the hearsay rule 
forbids."' United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation 
mnitted). A defendant would then "never want to testify" because he could 
"make evidence in his favor at his pleasure." Fernandez, 604 A.3d at 1313. 
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"The door would be thrown open to obvious abuse: an accused could create 
evidence for himself by making statements in his favor for subsequent use 
at his trial to show his innocence." Brooks. 909 S.W.2d at 863 (citation 
omitted). 
This Court should follow the lead of these courts and commentators 
and hold that before hearsay is admissible under rule 106, its proponent 
must show that it fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. Because 
Defendant concedes that his statements were hearsay, this Court should 
also affirm the trial court's ruling. 
2. Alternatively, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
because rule 106' s "fairness" standard did not require 
admission of Defendant's hearsay statements. 
Even if rule 106 allowed otherwise inadmissible hearsay in limited 
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
hearsay statements here, because they did not meet the rule's "fairness" 
require1nen t. 
As stated, the purpose of rule 106 is only "to prevent a 'misleading 
impression created by taking matters out of context.'" State v. Jones, 2015 
UT 19, ,I40, 345 P.3d 1195 (quoting State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if 44 n.6, 
993 P.2d 232). Rule 106 applies only when, "in fairness," other portions of a 
writing are "necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context" an 
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otherwise misleading "portion already introduced." Leleae, 1999 UT App 
368, if43 (citations omitted); accord Jones, 2015 UT 19, if 40; State v. Cruz-Meza, 
2003 UT 32, ~14, 76 P.3d 1165. 
"Fairness does not require that the h·ial court allow admission of 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay." Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 948 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008) (upholding exclusion of inadmissible hearsay under rule 106 
where defendant did not testify and thus "admission of the excluded 
conversations would be unfair since the State could not question 
[ defendant] as to their contents"); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 134 
(4th Cir. 2014) (rule 106 does not require the blind "ad1nission of self-
serving, exculpatory state1nents 1nade by a party which are being sought for 
admission by that same party"). 
Thus, rule 106 is not a means by which a defendant can simply 
"thwart hearsay rules and ad1nit his entire statement without being subject 
to cross-examination." McAtee v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608, 630-31 
(Ky. 2013) (rule 106' s fairness standard "does not 1nean that by inh·oducing 
a portion of a defendant's confession in which the defendant admits the 
cmnmission of the criminal offense, the [prosecution] opens the door for the 
defendant to use the remainder of that out-of-court statement for the 
purpose of asserting a defense without subjecting it to cross-examination"); 
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accord State v. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642, 650-51 (Wis. 1998); cf People v. Davis, 
218 P.3d 718, 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) ("[s]elf-serving hearsay declarations 
made by a defendant may [ still] be excluded" under the rule of 
cmnpleteness "because there is nothing to guarantee their 
trustworthiness"). 
Rather, in" determining fairness," one issue is certainly "'whether the 
meaning of the included portion is altered by the excluded portion."' Sykes 
v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Ky. 2015). But courts may also 
consider whether admitting the unreliable hearsay statement "will insure a 
fair and hnpartial understanding of all of the evidence." United States v. 
Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992). Courts may also consider 
whether the probative value of the unreliable hearsay "is substantially 
outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
misleading the jury, or waste of time, Rule 403." Graham, Handbook on 
Federal Evidence, at §106.1 (4th ed. 1996). Cf State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 
iri,9-15, 76 P.3d 1165 (affirn1ing exclusion of defendant's self-serving 
explanation to friend for why he killed girlfriend, where the statement 
lacked "any circumstantial guarantees of h·ustworthiness or indicia of 
reliability"). 
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Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion 
under rule 106. Most importantly, except for one statement in which 
Defendant said he attacked Angela because he was mad, all of Defendant's 
statements elicited through Detective Reyes on direct examination were 
admissions regarding how Defendant assaulted Angela. R749:81-98. Thus, 
Detective Reyes' testimony went almost exclusively to Defendant's conduct, 
not to why Defendant engaged in the conduct. 
Defendant makes no claim that Detective Reyes' testimony distorted 
or was otherwise misleading as to Defendant's conduct. See Aplt.Br. 8-20. 
See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 435 (9th Cir. 1985) (removing 
defendant's explanation of "motivations for his actions did not change the 
meaning of the portions of his confession sub1nitted to the jury" or "alter 
the fact that he admitted committing the acts with which he was charged"). 
Defendant thus has not shown that his self-serving statements 
regarding why he engaged in the conduct were necessary in fairness "to 
qualify, explain., or place into context" Detective Reyes' testimony 
concerning what Defendant's conduct was. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if 43 
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 669, 728 (5th Cir. 
1006) (neither rule 106 nor the rule of completeness required adn1itting 
defendant's exculpatory state1nents explaining why he picked up and fired 
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weapon). Compare United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(in gun possession case, Haddad's denial that he knew a gun was under his 
bed was admissible to place in context his admission that he knew drugs 
were under the bed; without the denial, the drug admission unfairly 
implied that Haddad also admitted knowing the gun was there). 
Admittedly, Detective Reyes' testimony that Defendant said he 
attacked Angela because he was mad addressed more than just Defendant's 
conduct. But Defendant's brief provides no insight as to how that statement 
was misleading. See Aplt. Br. 8-20. Nor can he, where the statement implies 
nothing about whether Defendant's anger was legally excusable or not. 
Thus, again, Defendant has not shown that his self-serving statements were 
necessary "to qualify, explain, or place into context" Detective Reyes' 
testimony. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ,43 (citation omitted). 
Finally, under rule 106' s "fairness" standard, the trial court could 
properly consider whether it was fair to the State and the victim to admit 
Defendant's after-the-fact explanation that 1ninimized his culpability by 
shifting part of the blame to his murder victim. See Williamson v. United 
States. 512 U.S. 594, 601 (1994) ( exculpatory statements umeliable and "this 
is especially true" when the II statement implicates someone else"). Indeed, 
just as II a codefendant' s statements about what the defendant said or did are 
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less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence," Williamson, 512 U.S. at 601, so 
too are a defendant's statements that cast aspersions on a victim who can no 
longer defend herself. 
The h·ial court could also properly consider whether it was fair to the 
State and the victim to allow Defendant in a jury trial to rely on his 
inherently unreliable hearsay statements to assert a defense that he had the 
burden of proving and that the State could not cross-examine him on. See 
Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 361 (Dela. 1998) (upholding denial of rule 
106 motion in light of rule 403, where defendant's decision to not testify 
denied State ability to test his credibility through cross-examination); 
McAtee, 413 S.W.3d at 630-31 (rule 106's fairness standard "does not mean 
that by introducing a portion of a defendant's confession in which the 
defendant admits the commission of the criminal offense, the [prosecution] 
opens the door for the defendant to use the remainder of that out-of-court 
statement for the purpose of asserting a defense without subjecting it to 
cross-examination"); cf State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, °if16-17, 76 P.3d 1165 
(rejecting defendant's claim that trial court's exclusion of his explanation for 
1nurder deprived him "of the opportunity to present evidence supporting a 
defense of extreme emotional distress without taking the witness stand"). 
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All these considerations support the trial court's ruling precluding 
Defendant frmn eliciting his self-serving hearsay through Detective Reyes. 
None of Defendant's cases undermine the trial court's ruling. See 
Aplt.Br. 12-14 (citing Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376 (D.C. 2006); State v. 
Cabrera-Pena. 605 S.E.2d 522 (S.C. 2004); Long v. State, 610 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 
1992) (per curiam)). Defendant first cites Cox. Cox was arrested in the 
District of Columbia for having a gun without a license after his car was 
stopped on an unrelated matter. Cox. 898 A.2d at 378. When Cox saw the 
police looking inside his car, he told them that he did not have a license for 
the gun in the District but that his gun was registered in Maryland and that 
he had simply forgotten to take the gun out of the car after using it for 
target shooting the day before. Id. at 379. At trial, the police officer testified 
only to Cox's statement that he did not have a license. Cox sought to elicit 
the rest of his statement under rule 106 to clarify the mis-impression left by 
the officer's testimony that Defendant gave no innocent explanation for 
having the gun. Id. at 379-80. The trial court denied Cox's request on the 
ground that his statements were inadmissible hearsay and not necessary 
under rule 106. Id. The appellate court held that the trial court erred. The 
court first concluded that Cox's statements were not hearsay because they 
were not offered for their h·uth but merely to show that they were made. Id. 
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380-81. The court then held the evidence was necessary under rule 106 to 
clarify the misimpression left by the officer's testimony, but that any error 
was harmless. Id. at 381-83. 
Unlike Cox, Defendant acknowledges that his self-serving statements 
were offered to support his extreme emotional distress defense and were 
thus hearsay. Aplt.Br. 9-10. Also unlike Cox, Defendant has made no 
showing that his hearsay state1nents were necessary to clarify any testimony 
under rule 106. Id. 8-20. Cox, therefore, is distinguishable. 
Cabrera-Pena is likewise distinguishable, but for different reasons. 
First, unlike here, Cabrera-Pena involved an unrecorded oral state1nent. 
State v. Cabrera-Pena. 605 S.E.2d 522, 524-26 (S.C. 2004). Second, unlike Utah, 
which limits the reach of rule 106 to only those portions of a statement 
necessary to clarify portions already admitted, South Carolina appears to 
superimpose the common law rule of co1npleteness onto its rule 106 
analysis. See id. (holding under case law that when one part of 
conversation admitted, adverse party entitled to prove remainder, so long 
as relevant). 
Finally, Long involved the State's use of a brief excerpt of a television 
interview with Long, Long had been denied access to the complete 
interview. Long v. State, 610 So.2d 1276, 1279-80 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam). 
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The appellate court held that Long's inability to access the complete 
interview precluded him from determining whether he was II entitled to 
bring out the remainder" of the video under rule 106. Id. 1280. Thus, Long 
did not involve a defendant's attempt to admit evidence under rule 106; 
rather, it involved a defendant's ability to discover evidence that, 
depending on what it revealed, might have been admissible under rule 106. 
Id. 
In sum, Defendant has not shown that the trial abused its discretion 
when it precluded him from eliciting his self-serving hearsay statements. 
3. Finally, even if the trial court erred, Defendant's claim 
fails for lack of prejudice. 
Finally, even if the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
Defendant's proffered statements, Defendant cannot show prejudice. 
Defendant claims he was prejudiced because the trial court's ruling 
11 completely precluded [him] frmn presenting his theory of the case," 
thereby depriving him II of his due process right to present a complete 
defense." Aplt.Br. 17. Defendant argues that if the court had permitted his 
self-serving hearsay statements, he "would have been entitled to a jury 
Defendant speculates that" the jury n1ay well have found special mitigation 
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by a preponderance of the evidence" because "the evidence was consistent 
with [his] theory" that he acted under extreme emotional distress. Id. 20. 
Based on his assertion that the trial court's alleged error violated his 
due process rights, Defendant argues the error was harmful unless the State 
proves that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Aptl.Br. 17; see also 
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, if 45, 55 P.3d 573 (when error involves a 
constitutional violation, State must prove error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt). As demonstrated, however, the trial court's error-if 
any- did not deprive Defendant of his right to present a defense. See Point 
l.C. supra; State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 1~16-17, 76 P.3d 1165 (rejecting 
defendant's contention that exclusion of his hearsay statements deprived 
him of right to present an extreme emotional distress defense, where "Cruz-
Meza was entirely free to choose" to present evidence supporting his 
defense by testifying). 
The trial court's error, if any, therefore, was not a constitutional one. 
Consequently, prejudice exists only if Defendant can show a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result absent the error. See State v. Williams, 2014 UT 
App 198, ,I20, 333 P.3d 1287. Defendant has not made and cannot make that 
showing here. 
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First, contrary to Defendant's suggestion, see Aplt.Br. 19, a defendant 
is not entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense merely because 
some evidence-however unreliable- supports that theory. See, e.g. Clark v. 
State, 928 So.2d 193, 196 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) ("Each party has the right to 
have his theory of the case presented to the jury by instructions, provided 
that there is credible evidence that supports that theory.") (emphasis added); 
accord People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 163 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Samson 
v. State., 69 P.3d 1154, 1160 (Mont. 2003); Foster v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 
198, 200 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). Rather, he is entitled to an instruction only 
when the evidence provides a "reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that" 
the theory applies. State v. Martinez, 2013 UT App 154, if 3, 304 P.3d 110 
(discussing defendant's right to a self-defense instruction) (citation omitted; 
alterations in original) ( emphasis added). 
Thus, even in cases where the defendant carries no burden of proof at 
all, if "the evidence is so slight as to be incapable of raising a reasonable 
doubt in the jury's mind" as to whether a defense applies, "tendered 
instructions thereon are properly refused." State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 
1389-90 (Utah 1977) (citation 01nitted); accord State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, i125, 
61 P.3d 1019; see also State v. Orej, 2010 UT 35, if 15, 233 P.3d 476 (State must 
disprove existence of affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt once 
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defendant produces some evidence to support it). Here, Defendant had the 
burden of proving his special mitigation defense. See Drej, 2010 UT 25, ,121 
(recognizing that special mitigation statute places burden of proof on 
defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the 
evidence); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5 (West Supp. 2009) (defining 
extreme emotional distress as special mitigation). The evidentiary basis 
supporting the defense, therefore, must be at least that high. 
But no matter what the level of reasonable basis is required, 
Defendant would not have met it even had the trial court admitted his 
hearsay statements. That is because Defendant's clahn to an extreme 
emotional dish·ess mitigation defense turns on his own self-serving and 
thus inherently unreliable hearsay statements. See R750:13 ( defense 
acknowledging that no evidence supports extreme e1notional distress 
instruction without Defendant's self-serving hearsay statement); see also 
State v. Fernandez, 604 A.2d 1308, 1313 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993) (self-
exculpatory out-of-court statements are "inherently umeliable"). And 
Defendant's unreliable hearsay staten1ents here do not constitute a 
"reasonable basis" for the jury to conclude that his exh·eme emotional 
dish·ess mitigation defense applies, let alone a reasonable basis to conclude 
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that he has proven that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Martinez, 2013 UT App 154, ,I3. 
Finally, even if Defendant's hearsay statements could have justified 
an extreme emotional distress defense in this case, any error in excluding 
them was harmless because "no reasonable likelihood exists that the error 
affected the outcome" of Defendant's case. State v. Ferguson, 2011 UT App 
77, ,I19, 250 P.3d 89 (emphasis added). 
The evidence in this case shows that Defendant brutally attacked 
Angela for some six hours; that in the process, he tore Angela's lips out, 
strangled her several tin1es, stomped on her, and broke eight ribs; that he 
delayed calling for help for over hvo hours after Angela died and then did 
so only anonymously; that he manipulated Angela's body after she died; 
that he spent time trying to clean up the mess he had made not only trying 
to clean up Angela, but by trying to wipe blood off her bedroom walls and 
her bathroom floor, vanity, and tub; and that he then fled to a friend's house 
and refused to come out for six hours after police had arrived. See 
Sumn1ary of Facts, supra. 
Given this evidence, no reasonable jury would have believed that 
Defendant tortured Angela for six hours and then killed her only in a bout 
of "extreme emotional distress for which there [was] a reasonable 
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explanation or excuse." Utah Code Aim. § 76-5-205.S(l)(b). Indeed, there 
was nothing reasonable about Defendant's prolonged and brutal attack. 
That the jury would reject Defendant's defense is even more certain 
where, as the h·ial court stated, the admission of Defendant's statements 
would have opened the door to evidence of Defendant's prior shnilar 
attacks on Angela, including an attack just two weeks before he killed her. 
R750:12-13. See, e.g.,State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, 344 P.3d 191 
(affirming Defendant's convictions for aggravated kidnapping and assault 
with substantial bodily injury after Defendant got mad at Angela because 
she would not let a friend stay over and hit her, pulled her hair, and almost 
bit her ear off). As the trial court noted, that evidence "would've totally 
undercut" any contention that Defendant's deadly attack on Angela "was 
an out of character, extreme, overwrought, emotional response to a 
triggering event." Id. 
In short, even if the trial court's ruling was erroneous, the error was 
not only harmless. See State v. Williams, 2014 UT App 198, ,I20, 333 P.3d 
1287 (evidentiary errors are harmless if there is no reasonable likelihood 
that error affected the result). 
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II 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT TRIED TO CLEAN UP 
THE BLOOD IN THE MURDER VICTIM'S APARTMENT 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS OBSTRUCTING 
JUSTICE CONVICTION 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
obstructing justice conviction. Aplt.Br. 20-32. Specifically, Defendant 
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support that he intended to 
kill Angela or that he cleaned up the aparhnent after she died with the 
intent to conceal evidence. Id. 20. Defendant also asserts that any 
contention that he intended to hinder a 1nurder investigation, "was belied 
by the fact that bloodstains pervaded the crime scene" and he ''himself 
called the police and left the door open for them." Id. 28. In short, 
Defendant argues, "there was no evidence" that he "ever concealed or 
destroyed evidence specifically intending to hinder the investigation of 
Angela's murder." Id. 31. 
In a sufficiency challenge, this Court views "the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I18, 10 P.3d 346. This Court reverses 
only if, "in that light, 'the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
i1nprobable such that reasonable 1ninds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant c01n1nitted the crime for which he or she was 
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convicted."' State v. Ricks, 2013 UT App 238, ,rs, 314 P.3d 1033 (quoting 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, if18). "So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made," this Court's "inquiry stops." State v. 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, if 16, 25 P.3d 985. 
Here, the jury was instructed that to convict Defendant of obsh·ucting 
justice, it had to find that he: 
2. 
3. 
altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any item or other 
thing. 
That [he] acted with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the 
investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
punishment regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal 
offense; AND 
4. That [his] conduct constituted the criminal offense of 1nurder. 
R668 (Instr. 23). See also Utah Code Ann. § .76-8-306(1)(c), (3)(a) (West Supp. 
2014) ( defining second degree felony obsh·uction of justice). 
At trial, the State presented the following evidence supporting 
Defendant's guilt of that crime: 
Defendant assaulted Angela for some six hours, R748:48-
51,57-64;R7 49:90-91; 
Defendant punched, slapped, kicked, stomped on, and 
strangled Angela, R749:81-98; 
Angela lost consciousness several times, R749:86,91; 
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due to the injuries Defendant inflicted on her face, 
Angela likely bled substantially, but she had relatively 
little blood on her face when police found her, R748:157-
58,165-66; St.Exh. 7 A; 
both neighbors and police called and checked on 
Angela's apartment before 7:00 a.m., but no one 
answered, R748:57-64; 71-75; 
Angela died at least two hours before Defendant called 
for help at 10:00 a.m., 748:143,159-60; R:749:16-17; 
either Angela or items around her had been moved after 
rigor mortis had set in, R749:16-17; 
police found a wet, bloody wad of gauze near Angela's 
legs, as well as an empty bottle of peroxide and a spray 
bottle of antiseptic, R749:18-20,28; 
police found dripping-wet, bloody towels in a hamper, 
R749:17-18,21; 
police found smears of diluted blood on Angela's 
bedroom walls and a light switch, R749:17-18,21,23; 
police found that blood had been sufficiently wiped off 
Angela's bathroom floor, vanity, and tub to no longer be 
visible to the naked eye, R749:34-35,37-38; 
although Angela had been dead for at least two hours by 
the tilne Defendant called 911, he did not report a death, 
but only that a woman was not breathing, R748:126-
27, 130,134; 
Defendant called 911 anony1nously and then fled, 
R7 48:76, 94, 126-27, 130-134;R7 49:13. 
The evidence of the brutal attack, the lack of response when 
neighbors and police checked in on the apartment, the fact that Angela had 
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died several hours before Defendant called 911, and the fact that either 
Angela or items around her were moved after rigor mortis had set in all 
support a reasonable inference that at some point-either before Angela 
actually died or after-Defendant realized he had killed her. 
The evidence of the bloody injuries to Angela's face, the relative lack 
· of blood on her face when police found her, the bloody wad of gauze near 
her, the soaking wet, bloody towels found in the hamper, the diluted blood 
on the bedroom walls, and the latent blood on the bathroom floor, vanity, 
and tub all support a reasonable inference that sometime after that 
realization, Defendant tried to clean up- i.e., "alter[], destroy[], conceal[], or 
remove[]" -evidence showing not only that he killed Angela during a 
brutal attack but how brutal the attack actually was. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-306(1)(c). 
Finally, evidence that Defendant did not respond when neighbors 
and police checked in on the apartment, that he waited two hours before 
calling 911, that he called 911 anonymously, and that when he called 911, he 
did not report a death but only a person not breathing all support a 
reasonable inference that Defendant's intent was "to hinder, delay or 
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
punishment" regarding Angela's murder. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-306(1)(c). 
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Defendant's contends, however, that there was no evidence to 
support that he ever intended to murder Angela. Aplt.Br. 20. Defendant's 
contention is not credible on its face. But even if it were, Defendant's 
murder charge in this case did not require proof that Defendant intended to 
kill Angela. R662; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (homicide 
constitutes murder if the actor causes the death "intentionally or 
knowingly" or if "intending to cause serious bodily injury to another," he 
"commits an act clearly dangerous to human life" or if "acting under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life," he 
"knowingly engages in conduct which creates a crave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another"). Nor did obstructing 
justice charge. Rather, it required proof only that at s01ne point Defendant 
realized he had. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-306(1)(c). 
Contrary to Defendant's contention, therefore, the State presented 
1nore than sufficient" evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made." 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, if 16. 
In asserting otherwise, heavily on his description of his conduct to 
police - such as that he used the gauze on Angela to try to revive her; that 
after she lost consciousness that last time, he fell asleep for two hours; and 
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that he was distraught when Detective Reyes told him Angela was dead. 
Aplt.Br.26-29. But the jury was under no obligation to believe Defendant's 
statements. Cf Sate v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, if 41, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 
("Essentially, Mr. Reece asked the jury to believe that sometime during a 
crime scene that spanned two hours and in which he committed multiple 
felonies, he felt compelled to stop at the victim's him just to be a good 
citizen. We find his story to be simply incredible."). 
Alternatively, Defendant argues that the State presented no evidence 
"that he concealed evidence specifically intending to hinder the 
investigation" of Angela's murder. Aplt.Br. 29. But as this Court has 
repeatedly held, "[k]nowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be 
inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying 
circumstances." State v. Bingham, 2015 UT App 103, if29, _ P.3d _ 
(quoting State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ,r10, 988 P.2d 949). And as 
stated, the jury had more than enough evidence in this case-including 
Defendant's cleaning up blood from bedromn walls and bathroom floors 
and moving Angela's body after she died - from which to infer the 
necessary intent. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient because 
"bloodstains pervaded the crime scene" and he "himself called the police." 
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Aplt.Br. 28. But Defendant called the police anonymously, and concealing 
the murderer's identity would certainly hinder the murder investigation; 
indeed, it let Defendant flee from the scene. R748:126-27,130,134. Also, the 
obstructing justice statute requires only proof that the person concealed or 
altered one item or thing. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1)(c) (requiring 
proof that the defendant "altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any 
item or other thing") (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that Defendant was 
not particularly good at concealing evidence-Le., that he was not 
successful in concealing every piece of it-does not defeat his obstructing 
justice conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's 
convictions. 
Respectfully submitted on June 3, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK \ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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Addenda 
., Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2009) 
Gi> ( 1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 
years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
( d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-
404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(I) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
( o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 7 6-6-103; 
( q) burglary under Section 7 6-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-30 I; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or 
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding discharge of a 
firearm or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
( c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the 
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby causes the death of another; 
( d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a 
party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the 
course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate 
offense; 
( e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer or military service member 
in unifonn while in the commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 
76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; or 
(iii) an assault against a military service member in uniform under Section 7 6-5-
102.4; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is 
reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202( 4 ); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established 
under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the 
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another under a 
reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the 
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection ( 4)(a) shall be determined 
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
( c) This affinnative defense reduces charges only from: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate 
offense does not merge with the crime of murder. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described in 
Subsection (I) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and 
punished for, the separate offense. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-205.5 (West Supp. 2009) 
(I) Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death of another or attempts to 
cause the death of another: 
(a)(i) under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts under a 
delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; 
(ii) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant 
believed them to be in the delusional state, those facts would provide a legal 
justification for the defendant's conduct; and 
(iii) the defendant's actions, in light of the delusion, were reasonable from the 
objective viewpoint of a reasonable person; or 
(b) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. 
(2) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or 
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged 
offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under Subsection (l)(a) on the basis of 
~ mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed to 
the mental illness. 
(3) Under Subsection ( 1 )(b ), emotional distress does not include: 
(a) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(b) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
( 4) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection ( 1 )(b) shall be 
i.@1 determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances. 
(5)(a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection (5)(b) are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation under 
this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a verdict on 
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5)(6). 
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
attempted murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted 
manslaughter. 
( 6)(a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to establish the 
existence of the special mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a 
verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5). 
( c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been 
established, it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the 
prosecution has established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
( d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special mitigation has 
been established, the result is a hung jury. 
(7)(a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the trier of fact, it shall return a 
special verdict indicating whether the existence of special mitigation has been found. 
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at the same time as the general 
verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict. 
(8) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any case, reduce the level of an 
offense by more than one degree from that offense, the elements of which the evidence 
has established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West Supp. 2009) 
• (1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or 
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense: 
• 
• 
(a) provides any person with a weapon; 
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from perfonning any act 
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment 
of any person; 
( c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing; 
( d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false; 
( e) harbors or conceals a person; 
(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding 
discovery or apprehension; 
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension; 
(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire communications 
or of a pending application for an order authorizing the interception of wire 
communications; 
(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a 
judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or 
G) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting 
an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation. 
(2 )(a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means 
conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of this 
section, and includes: 
(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political 
subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or teITitory of the United 
States; and 
(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an 
adult. 
(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States, is a: 
(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment 
without parole; 
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with 
parole or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years; 
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years; 
(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any 
period exceeding one year; and 
(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period 
of one year or less. 
(3) Obstruction of justice is: 
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a 
capital felony or first degree felony; 
(b) a third degree felony if: 
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree 
felony and the actor violates Subsection ( I )(b ), ( c), ( d), ( e ), or ( f); 
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a 
capital or first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (1 )(a); 
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or 
(iv) a violation of Subsection (1 )(h); or 
( c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated 
under Subsection (3)(a) or (b). 
( 4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct 
constituting an offense. 
(5) Subsection (I)( e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed 
by Section 62A-7-402. 
( 6) Subsection ( 1 )(b) does not apply to: 
(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5; 
(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-316; 
( c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is governed 
by Section 76-8-508; 
(d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed by Section 
76-8-508.3; or 
( e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed 
by Section 76-8-509. 
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony if 
the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has escaped from official custody as 
defined in Section 76-8-309. 
Utah R. Evid. 106 
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may 
require the introduction, at that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded 
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time. 
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in the middle of his testimony. I was (inaudible}. 
THE COURT: All right. That'd be fine. 
CHAD REYES 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOEHM: 
Q Thank you for being here. Would you tell the jury 
your name, please? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
It's Chad Reyes, last name is spelled R-E-Y-E-S. 
And what do you do for a living? 
I work for the Unified Police Department. 
How long have you worked in law enforcement? 
Approximately 16 years. 
And would you summarize your experience during your 
career in law enforcement? 
A I started off in the corrections area in the jail, 
I worked there for about a year, moved from there into 
patrol, did some traffic investigation, and then I moved into 
the violent crimes unit, where I served as a detective for 
approximately eight years. From there, I was promoted to 
sergeant, and moved back to patrol for a short period of time 
until I moved into K-9, and I currently supervise the UPD's 
K-9 unit. 
Q I think it's pretty clear that this case is about 
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Q These are State's Exhibit 73 and State's Exhibit 
74. Could you briefly describe what is depicted in State's 
Exhibit 73? 
A Seventy-three appears to be Mr. Sanchez 1 s right 
hand, a photograph of his right hand that was taken at the 
hospital at St. Mark's that day. 
Q And what is in State's Exhibit 74? 
A Seventy-four is a photograph taken at the hospital 
that day of his left hand. 
Q And do those photographs accurately depict what you 
saw when you saw the defendant there in the hospital? 
A They do. 
MR. BOEHM: We would move to admit State's Exhibit 
70 - is it 73 and 74? 
WITNESS: Yeah, 73, 74. 
MR. BOEHM: State's 73, State's 74 that -
MR. DELLAPIANA: No objection. 
THE COURT: They'll be received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 73 and 74 received) J 
Q (BY MR. BOEHM) When you get to the hospital, do you 
immediately begin to speak to the defendant, or what do you 
do? 
A No, I waited for some time before I spoke to the 
defendant, waited for hospital staff to offer a treatment, 
further evaluate him, and I let them take care of him, 
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basically, before I tried to speak with him at all. 
Q Okay. When did you begin to speak with him? 
After he'd been assessed by the physicians and the 
nurses, and I conferred a little bit with them, and then 
determined that we were at a point where I could attempt to 
interview Mr. Sanchez. 
Q Most of my questions, I guess, for the remainder of 
your testimony, deal with that specific interview. So, if 
you have questions, it looks like you've got a large binder 
there. Please just let me know if you need to look at 
anything, I'll ask the judge and we'll see if it's okay if 
that refreshes your memory. 
A Great. Thank you. 
Q What address did the defendant provide to you as 
his home address? 
A He provided 1743 East 3080 South, which is the 
coordinate for Gregson Avenue, so the Gregson Avenue address. 
Q And so whose home is that? 
Roger Gary Warner's. 
Q Did you ask him for a phone number? 
A I did. 
Q What did he say? 
A He told me he didn't have one, that he shared a 
24 phone with Mr. Warner. 
25 Q Did you get any other information or do anything 
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else before you began to question him? 
A I did. As I mentioned, I spoke with the doctors, 
and then I also tried to assess him myself, make sure that he 
was of mental ability, based on all the trauma, and then his 
mention of the methadone that he had taken, that he was 
capable of talking to me; he was in a mental state he was 
capable of responding to my questions and having a 
conversation with me, a lucid conversation. 
Q What kind of questions did you ask him to verify 
that? 
A I asked him about his educational background, his 
date of birth, his name spelling, the current day, the 
current date at the time, his work history, basic questions 
like that. 
In general, were his responses accurate? 
Yes. 
Was there anything that was off? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A He mentioned to me the - May 8 th - I asked him what 
the date was, and it was May 5th , obviously, and he told me 
that the date was May 8 th • So, he was off by a few days. 
Q Okay. But other than that, his responses were 
accurate? 
A Correct. 
Q What did you do after you went through that 
procedure? 
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A After I went through that, as part of my rapport 
building process, that was part of the rapport building 
process as well, but I typically start off my stories with 
just a brief analogy about truthfulness, and I offered a 
story similar to that to Mr. Sanchez. 
Q 
A 
rights. 
Q 
After you'd done this analogy, what did you do? 
I offer - or I advised Mr. Sanchez of his Miranda 
And those are the same rights that we hear on any 
television show where someone's being advised, you know, what 
rights they have. 
A Yes. 
Q What did he say in response? 
A He acknowledged that he understood each of his 
rights, and he agreed to speak with me without an attorney 
present. 
Okay. So what did he say after that? Q 
A I asked him what happened. I asked him to tel~ me 
what happened, and initially his responses were fairly vague. 
He told me that he got into a fight with Angela. I asked him 
to elaborate, and he told me that he slapped her, he thumped 
her, and then he called the cops. 
Q And how did you respond? 
A As I mentioned, I felt that the brief explanation 
that he gave me was fairly vague and lacked detail, so I 
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1 asked him to elaborate. 
Q And what did he say? 
A He told me that he slugged her a little bit, and 
that it went farther than it should have. 
Q Did he say when this fight began? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
A He said the night before, so last night, I believe, 
was - were his words. 
Q Okay. And so, this interview that took place, 
9 i then, we' re still talking about the afternoon of May 5 th • 
10 A Correct, probably around 4:30 p.m. on the - on the 
11 : 5th• 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Q So, you took the term last night to mean the night 
of May 4 th • 
A 
Q 
7\ .. _ 
Correct. 
Did you find out more about how it began? 
Yeah, I asked him how it began. He mentioned that 
17 I it started the night before, and he told me that he pulled 
18 her hair, and - he got mad at her and he pulled her hair. 
19 Q Okay. Was there anything interesting about the 
20 statement that he had pulled her hair, in terms of the 
21 evidence that might have been located at the scene? 
22 A Yeah, there were some strands of hair that were 
23 I located in the house that were consiste:-it with some sort of a 
24 i physical assault where someone would be pulling hair from 
25 another human's head. 
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1 Q What was the length of the defendant's hair when 
2 I you were (inaudible) this interview? 
3 
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5 
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A 
Q 
A 
The length of the defendant's hair was very short. 
Okay. And the length of Angela Jenkins' hair? 
Was I believe around shoulder length, maybe a 
little longer. 
Q Okay. So the finding this hair - did you say 
whether it was more pieces of Angela's hair being a little 
bit longer, or of the defendant's being much shorter? 
A It was consistent with Angela's hair, and 
inconsistent with the defendant's. 
Q What did he say after he said that he'd pulled her 
hair? 
A He said that - I again asked him to elaborate a 
15, little bit, and he mentioned again that he pulled her hair, 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
he slapped her, he said he choked her a little bit, and ~t 
was over from there. 
Q When he said that he was choking her, you know, why 
is that significant in your training and experience? 
A Choking is often depicted in movies and even maybe 
from our own experiences as something that is easily 
survivable, and often times when it's done in horseplay it 
is-
MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, I'm going to object. This 
seems to be some sort of speculative, perhaps irrelevant 
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1 opinion evidence. I don't think it's relevant or necessary 
2 I from this witness. 
3 THE COURT: Your response? 
4 MR. BOEHM: I guess I can lay a little bit more 
5 foundation. It's a very significant portion of the interview 
6 is detailing the choking and the strangling that was 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
discussed by the defendant, and so if - I'm trying to lay the 
foundation that explained why -
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BOEHM: - he's asking the question . 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, Judge, if I may, I think it's 
fair for the officer to testify as to what statements Mr. 
Sanchez made to him about this. But the question was, and 
14 starting off on something that was unrelated to this case 
15 about what people see in movies or something, it's abundantly 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Okay, why don't you - why don't you 
tailor your response to the questions that are posed? 
MR. BOEHM: There we go. Fair enough. 
Q (BY MR. BOEHM) Have you received training as a law 
21 ! enforcement officer involving strangulation? 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
I have. 
And what's the basis for that training? What's the 
need for that training? 
A Just level of offense and level of injury that 
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could be associated with strangulation, so it - I guess to 
keep it specific, the difference between, for example, a 
misdemeanor type assault versus an aggravated assault, where 
someone might be attempt - attempting or intending to inflict 
serious bodily injury, choking is definitely a method that 
would allow serious bodily injury or even death to be 
inflicted. 
Q So, this is something that's important to you when 
you're interviewing somebody. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. When did he say that he choked her? 
A He initially said that he only choked her a little 
bit right at the end of the - right at the end of the 
assault. 
Q And I would - if we may, there's a question that 
you asked him, and I think it's down on page nine of your 
interview, it's Bates stamped Roman numeral 10.01, and a long 
string of zeros before the number nine. I'm looking 
specifically at lines 247 and 249. Would you read those to 
yourself? 
A Okay. 
Q Is it fair to say that at that point in the 
interview, he said that the timing of the choking was just 
last night? 
25 I A Yes. 
I 
l 
I 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Did you ask him anything else about that? 
I did. 
Okay, what did you ask him? 
I asked him if she lost consciousness at all. 
And what did he say? 
He said that she did a little bit. 
Did he elaborate? 
I asked him to elaborate, and he said that she lost 
consciousness and that he attempted to revive her on a couple 
occasions by breathing for her. 
Q Did he make any physical gestures to explain what 
12 I he meant by breathing for her? 
13 
14 
A No. In fact, I tried to get him to explain that a 
little bit more, and I even offered - I asked him 
15 specifically if he performed CPR or just mouth to mouth, and 
16 
17 
he just repeatedly, I think three or four times throughout 
the interview in different parts, said that he would breathe 
18 ! for her. 
19 
20 
Q 
A 
Okay. What did he claim to do after that? 
He claimed that - actually, let me - I have my 
21 l chain of thought, I thought in the right order, but if you 
22 
23 
24 
25 
don't mind me referring to my notes here really quick? 
MR. BOEHM: Is that okay, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
WITNESS: Thank you. 
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THE WITNESS: Can you repeat your question one more 
time? 
Q (BY MR. BOEHM) Yeah, and maybe, just for the jury's 
benefit, let's talk about this, and we'll break back into 
that. I apologize for jumping around. This interview that 
you gave, was it recorded? 
A It was. 
Q Okay, so we - what you're looking at and referring 
to, what I'm looking at is a transcription of that report; is 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. I guess I'd like to know, he talked about 
this breathing for her. What else did you know, or what else 
did you want to know about this fight? 
A Well, I had seen Angela Jenkins prior to the 
interview. I initially had responded to the scene at Cherry 
Hill and had entered the apartment momentarily with Detective 
Park, so I was aware that the amount and level of injuries on 
Ms. Jenkins' body were not consistent with the vague 
responses that I was getting from Mr. Sanchez, so I asked him 
if he would elaborate on some of the other injuries that may 
have been caused. 
Q 
A 
Okay. And what did he say? 
I asked him specifically if he had kicked her, and 
he stated that he had, that he had used the heel of his foot, 
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and stomped on her thigh, or her hip area. 
Q 
A 
Okay. Anything else? 
I asked him if he could've kicked her anywhere 
else, and he i~dic3ted that maybe up towards her buttocks, 
and possibly on her shoulder. I asked him if he used any 
objects, and he stated no, just his heel. And I'm kind of 
jumping ahead a little bit as well, but in order to try and 
keep these in order, I recall asking him if he bit her 
anywhere, and he stated that he had bit her on her arm, and I 
asked him if he bit her anywhere else, and he said he might 
have, but he can't remember. 
Q So, he indicated that he used his feet and his 
mouth. Did he ever use his hands or his arms, or anything 
like that? 
A He did. After he mentioned those injuries to me, I 
asked him specifically about some injuries that I saw on her 
stomach and her torso, as Dr. Reese had described, they were 
small, oval injuries and so I asked him about those, and he 
explained to me that he had grabbed her stomach, and was 
20 clenching or pinching and pulling on those as well. 
21 Do you have any questions about that, or -
Q No. 22 
23 
! 
A - so, in addition to those injuries, I asked him if 
I 
_____ 2_4---i1·---~~ had done 
i.;j> 25 informed me 
j 
anything else to her face, and at that time he 
that he had grabbed her lip with his hands and 
I 
I 
1 
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2 tearing and so forth in her mouth. 
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Q Was there anything that he said about just the 
general injuries to the face? The diffuse swelling that's 
been described, did he describe how that could've occurred? 
A Yeah, I asked him if he ever punched her. He had 
already mentioned that he thumped her and he slugged her, 
those were his words that he used, and I asked him if he hit 
her with a close~ fist, he admitted that he had once, but 
then said that he repeatedly slapped her back and forth. I 
asked again, because of the extreme amount of swelling and 
congestion and bruising that was present on Ms. Jenkins' 
face, I asked him how he continued to injure her face, and 
how her nose and mouth became so bloody, and he told me that 
he had backhanded her. 
Q And did he say how often? 
A He just said repeatedly. He said that he slapped 
her several times forward and backwards, I believe is how he 
described the slapping, and then when I asked him 
specifically about the nose, he said he backhanded her. 
Q Was there any explanation - and it sounds like you 
said something about using one hand; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Was there any explanation for why he wasn't using 
the other hand? 
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A While I was at the hospital, I observed him receive 
treatment for a splint and a cast for his right hand, the 
pinky area, and I asked him about that, and indicated to him 
- I indicated to him that his pinky knuckle on his right hand 
was fractured, and he told me that it has, and that's how I 
asked him about the punching, and when he admitted that he 
had punched Angela at least one time, but he claimed that the 
fracture in his hand occurred when he punched the wall, not 
when he punched Angela. 
Q 
A 
Q 
How long did he say that this fight went on for? 
He said probably a couple hours. 
And without going into anything that Angela 
might've said, was she making any - were there any reactions? 
Where there any signs of distress that he told you about? 
A Yeah, I asked him specifically about the choki~g, 
and I asked if Angela was saying anything or reacting at all 
to him when he was choking her and he said that she wasn't 
saying much, she was just screaming. 
Q What did he say - or, I guess, when he talked about 
20 this again, or when - let me back up. So he said that the 
21 fight lasted probably for a couple of hours? 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Did he say a time when it bega~? 
He said it began last - last night, again, and then 
he estimated that it ended about eight or nine in the 
90 
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morning. 
Q Okay. So, the issue of a couple of hours didn't 
3 match up, necessarily, with the time frame that he's giving 
4 
5 
6 
7 
you. 
A With his own statements, no. 
Q Okay. What did he say that he did - or what 
happened - did he say anything more about what happened when 
8 i he choked her? 
9 
10 
A Yeah, I asked him at one point if she was fighting 
back at all, and he stated that, a little bit, were his 
11 1 words, but not much because she's a woman. I also asked him 
12 i if - as I mentioned previously, if she lost consciousness at 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
all when he was choking her or during the assault, and he 
said that she had, as I mentioned, and that he attempted to 
revive her and - by breathing for her, and also by taking her 
to a bath - to the bathtub, where he ran water over her head, 
or he put her head under the water, he told me. 
Q Okay. And, a moment or two ago I asked you when it 
ended, and you said something about eight or nine. When was 
20 ! this eight or nine, the end of this fight, in relation to 
21 this issue with her consciousness? 
22 A At eight or nine is when - my interpretation of the 
23 i interview with Mr. Sanchez was that Ms. Jenkins lost 
24 consciousness at least a little bit several times throughout 
25 the assault. At eight or nine, it was my understanding from 
I 
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Mr. Sanchez that Ms. Jenkins lost consciousness finally and 
was never able to be awakened again. 
Q What did he claim that she did - or what did he 
claim to have done himself after she lost consciousness at 
about eight or nine? 
A At eight or nine, he said that when she lost 
consciousness, he lied down with her and took a nap. 
Q 
A 
How long did he say he stayed asleep? 
Approximately an hour, is what I would assume. I 
don't remember if he - I don't remember if I asked him that 
specific question, or if he gave me a time frame, but he said 
he fell asleep for - or he laid down with her at eight o~ 
nine, and then he called the cops after he woke up, whicn 
would've been an hour or two later, depending on when that 
was. 
Q And did he mention at all whether he had called 
Gary before or after he called the police? 
A Yeah, he said after he woke up and could no longer 
arouse her or awaken her, he called Gary Warner and then 
called the police after that. 
Q And what did he do after that? 
A He left the apartment, indicated that he left the 
23 apartment because he was scared. 
24 
25 
Q Did he say why he was scared? 
A I don't believe he gave me an exact reason why, 
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Q Could I direct your attention to page 13 of your 
interview on line 346? It's ending - Bates stamp number -
Roman numeral 10.01, 
the number 18? 
A Yeah. 
string of consecutive zeros, and then 
(Inaudible conversation} 
Q (BY MR. BOEHM) Maybe if you would turn back one 
page, to page 12, and look at line 345. 
A Okay. 
Q And then ldok at 346, and see if that helps to 
refresh your memory. I believe the question was, why was he 
scared? Having looked at that, does that help to refresh 
your memory? 
A Yeah, basically what I said, just to elaborate a 
little bit more, is that she wasn't waking up, she wasn't 
saying anything any more, and so he was scared. 
Q What else did you want to find about - find out 
about his actions after he left the apartment? 
A After he left the apartment, I was curious about 
the - any evidence that he may have taken with him from the 
apartment, so specifically clothing that he was wearing 
during the assault, and where - what the location of that 
24 l might be. 
25 Q Okay. And what did he say? 
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A He told me that he was wearing a blue button-up 
shirt that he had left behind in the apartment - in apartment 
number 18, and that he was wearing green pants that he had 
taken off at Gary's and left in Gary's bedroom, as well as 
white socks that he had taken off and left in Gary's bedroom. 
Q Was there anything - were there any other items of 
clothing, say, a shirt or anything like that, that you asked 
him about? 
A The shirt - the blue shirt that was left behind, 
the pants - the shirt was in the apartment still, that's 
where he claimed to have left the blue shirt that he was 
wearing, and then the pants and the socks were at Mr. 
Warner's house. 
Q Did he describe what kind of shirt it was? 
A He did. He said it was a blue button-up shirt, 
short-sleeve. 
Q Did you learn anything more about James and 
Angela's relationship from talking to him? 
A I did. I asked Mr. Sanchez approximately how long 
he and Ms. Jenkins had been in a relationship, and he alleged 
about six months; however, even from Mr. Warner's own 
statement, and some of the other records, it appears that 
they were only in a relationship for about three to four 
months. 
Q Is it possible that he might have lived with her 
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for a brief time before they were in a relationship? 
A Yes. 
MR. BOEHM: Excuse me, just one moment. I 
apologize. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
Q (BY MR. BOEHM} Where did this fight take place 
inside of the apartment? 
A I asked Mr. Sanchez to describe that for me, and he 
told me in the back bedroom. Just to confirm that we were 
talking about the same bedroom - because it was a two-bedroom 
apartment - I had him provide descriptions of some of the 
furniture that was in there, and he mentioned the blue 
mattress without the sheets, and a TV and so forth, so we 
were - we were sure we were talking about the same bedroom. 
Q And what else did you want to find out about t~e 
scene inside the bedroom? 
A I asked him if he attempted to clean it up at all, 
because, as I mentioned, I'd been in the apartment prior to, 
and he mentioned that he did try to clean Angela up, and used 
hydrogen peroxide, and also talked about taking her to the -
to the bathtub. 
Q Did he say anything more about any cleaning agents 
I 
l 
23 like hydrogen peroxide or anything else? 
24 A Not that I can recall. Not specifically. 
25 Q Did he say anything about why she would need to 
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1 have her head placed under the faucet in the bathtub? 
2 A Just that she was - I took it for - I took his 
3 ! intentions there for two purposes. One was because he was 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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13 
trying to fully arouse her or awaken her, and then also 
because he mentioned that she was bleeding profusely from her 
face 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
bloody? 
A 
from the nose. 
Okay, and how -
And mouth. 
Excuse me. Was there any more to that? 
Just nose and mouth. No. 
Okay. Sorry to interrupt. How did her nose get so 
As I mentioned, I asked him about that 
14 I specifically, and he said that he backhanded her. 
15 
16 
Q I think - I wanted to ask you more about any of the 
facial injuries, but correct me if I'm wrong, you've already 
1 7 l talked about this issue of pulling on the lips. 
18 
19 
20 
.A Yeah, I'd asked him, because of the - the lip 
injury was so - so severe, I asked him about that 
specifically, and he told me that he grabbed her lips, or 
21 i stuck his hands in her mouth, and pulled down and to the 
22 
23 
side. 
Q According to the defendant, did Angela ever leave 
24 i the bedroom? 
25 A Yes. Just on that one occasion where he assisted 
·-·-,.·---•·••··--,,,,,, .... ~---····-·~-
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her to the bathroom or the bathtub, and tried to get her a 
little bit more alert by running her head under the water. 
Q Okay. How did your questioning of the defendant 
4 conclude? 
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A Well, as I mentioned, even throughout, as I asked 
specific questions to him, I had to - I had to try to - his 
questions and responses were always very vague. And so, I 
asked him at the end about how Angela ultimately lost 
consciousness for the last time, and asked him about his 
specific method of choking her. He mentioned to me that he -
as I talked about, at the very beginning of the interview, he 
says he used his hands only, and then as I questioned him a 
little bit further, I asked him if he used anything else to 
choke her. He told me that he got her in a headlock at one 
point, similar to a headlock, and that while he was doing 
that, it wasn't really having much effect, and so at the very 
end, with Angela lying on her back, and on the floor, he got 
on top of her and placed his elbow in her throat, and that 
wasn't having much effect either, so he used his forearm and 
leaned into her as she was lying on her back on the floor. 
After he did that, I asked him if she blacked out, and he 
said yes, that was the time that she blacked out, and she 
never regained consciousness from that point forward. 
Q Was he clear about where her body was positioned? 
A I don't believe I had him describe exactly where in 
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1 i the room, but it was clear that she was in ~he bedroom on the 
2 i floor, face up, so on her back. 
3 i Q Okay. And, did he describe where he placed his 
4 ! fore arm? 
5 A He placed it across the front of her neck. So, I 
6 I asked him specifically just, you know, on the front of her 
7 neck, while she's laying on her back, and you used your elbow 
8 and then your forearm, and he agreed that that was how he had 
9 finally caused her to lose consciousness for the last time. 
10 Q Before she lost consciousness, though~ did she 
11 l respond in any way? 
12 
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A No. He said that she blacked out and she didn't 
say anything at all. 
Q What was his response? 
A He said that he - after that, he laid down with her 
and I think that's when he said that he laid down with her 
and, after he woke up he was scared because she wasn't saying 
anything anymore, and so he called Mr. Warner and then called 
the police. 
Q But he was aware before he took this nap that she 
had lost consciousness. 
A Yes. I asked him if he was ever able to arouse her 
23 or awaken her again after that last moment, and he - I asked 
24 i him when that was, when - approximately what time it was that 
25 he used his forearm to chcke her, and he said that was about 
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eight or 9:0C in the morning that day. 
MR. BOEHM: If I could have one moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BOEHM: I guess I have one last exhibit. This 
is marked State's Exhibit 78. May I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MR. BOEHM) Are you familiar with what that 
exhibit, State's Exhibit 78, contains? 
A I am. 
Q Is that an accurate depiction of what - well, tell 
us what that is, briefly. 
A It's a driver's license photo of Ms. Jenkins. 
Q And is that an accurate reproduction of the photo 
which you may have reviewed when you were investigating Lhis 
case? 
A Yes. 
MR. BOEHM: We'd move to admit State's Exhibit 78 
into evidence. 
THE COURT: State's 78 will be received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 78 received) 
MR. BOEHM: Your Honor, I just want to make sure. 
Was there any objection on 78? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: No. 
MR. BOEHM: Your Honor, that's - concludes my 
questioning of this witness at this time. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DELLAPIANA: 
Q Good afternoon, Detective. 
A 
Q 
Afternoon. 
I'm just going to go through your earlier test~mony 
more or less in the order that you talked about things, or 
according to my notes, and ask some questions for 
8 clarification, to get a little bit more detail. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
A Sure. 
Q I think one of the first things you talked about 
was how you got involved in the case, and that is because you 
got notified of 9-1-1 calls to the Cherry Hills apartments. 
A Correct. 
Q All right. And eventually you learned that James 
Sanchez had made those calls. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
First one from inside the apartment number 18? 
Yes. 
And then a second one after looking at the video 
20 from the 7-Eleven, the second one from the 7-Eleven? 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
Correct. 
Okay. By the way, is it - is it correct that from 
23 the front of the Cherry Hill apartments, you can actually see 
24 the 7-Eleven just ~p the road? 
25 I believe so. I don't recall. I think - I think 
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you can. 
Q Now look at Exhibit 1 - are these in order, I hope? 
A No. They used to be. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
Q (BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Let me show you what's marked 
as State's Exhibit 1, and appears to show the front of the 
Cherry Hills apart~ents, and then the - up the street on the 
left are what looks like 7-Eleven signs. Does that appear to 
be the scene we're talking about? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Okay. So, it is visible from the front of the -
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And it'd be especially - especially note -
you'd see if ambulances were on the street in front of the 
house. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. You've indicated that there was clearly once 
you - well, let me say it. First you - soon, following your 
investigation, you went over to the house that was known as 
Roger Gary Warner's house, right? 
A Yes. 
Q And there was some delay in the having response 
from the occupants. 
A Yes. 
Q Now, eventually you said James Sanchez came out. 
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Let me ask you a question about that. Wasn't it fair to say 
that at the time the came out, he was in some kind of a drug 
induced stupor? Like -
.'A. I do~'t know that I'd say he was in a stupor. I 
assisted in contacting Mr. Sanchez when he came out of the 
house, and he did alert us fairly quickly that he had - I 
believe even before we - even before he exited the house, he 
mentioned to negotiators that he had ingested - I think he 
said 17 methadone pills that he had taken from the victim. 
Q Well, but he was lethargic, mumbling, clearly under 
the influence of some kind of a -
A He - he - I can say that he - he didn't have any 
pants on, he was obviously - he - it was an unusual day for 
him, I'll say that. I can't - I can't say that he appeaced -
I honestly can't say that he appeared lethargic. I mean, he 
communicated with us. Once he was in the ambulance, he did 
start to appear lethargic then, when he was laying on the 
stretcher and so forth. 
own. 
Q 
A 
Q 
All right. 
But he was able to walk out of the house on his 
Okay. All right, fair enough. And then you -
because he was starting to exhibit these symptoms, you d~.d 
take him to the hospital. 
---------· ·,o-••-····-·-·------------·-----· ·------.---·----------------...;.__-
25 A Yes. 
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Q This is a little bit out of order of what I was 
going to ask you, but how long was it between when you took 
him to the hospital and when you started to interview him? 
A We arrived at the hospital at 3:43, I believe, 
according to the dispatch notes, and I - I can't say exactly 
what time I started to interview him, I would guess at 
approximately an hour after we arrived. 
Q And that was after he was treated with Narcone? 
A Narcan, Yes, sir. 
Q Narcan? All right. There was - you gave some 
11 testimony about - I'll try not to misrepresent it, but that 
12 i you thought that Roger Gary Warner was planning some sort of 
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a getaway plan or something, for -
That's what Mr. Warner indicated to me, yes. A 
Q Let me - isn't it - let me get to the rest of the 
story. Didn't he - didn't he tell you that the plan was to 
let - his plan was to let James Sanchez get something to eat 
and sleep a while and take his insulin, 
in after that? 
and then turn himself 
A 
Q 
A 
options. 
He -
Does that sound familiar? 
It does. I think turn himself in was one of the 
I think Mr. Warner's intent was just to lead us 
away, and whether that was to buy time for James to eat or to 
sleep, or possibly even to escape, I don't know that Mr. 
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War~er even knew what the result of that would be. He just 
intended to lead us away. 
MR. HAMILTON: Well, can I approach? 
THE WITNESS: Sure. 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Go ahead and look at this, and 
see if it's recognized as an interview between Gary Warner 
and you, and read to yourself this section here, and see if 
that refreshes yo~r recollection. 
A Okay. 
Q So fair to say, he, at least at this point of the 
interview, told you his plan was to try to give James some 
time to eat, sleep, take his insulin, the idea he was going 
to turn himself in later? 
A Yeah. What this does to me, and what it reminds me 
of, is that Gary intended to lead us away - lead us away from 
the home, meaning that James would be there by himself and 
then Gary would give - make a deal with us later, is the word 
that he used, and talk James into meeting Gary at his work 
and then James and Gary would turn himself in. 
Q Okay. 
A So, that made me believe that it would allow James 
23 time to leave the house. 
24 Q Oh, I - I know you - I know you've asserted that 
25 that's what you thought might be possibly happening, I'm just 
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looking at the words there, and it says the plan was to let 
him eat, sleep, take some insulin, and then would plan to 
turn himself in. 
A And then to meet Gary at Gary's work to turn 
himself in. 
Q Thank you. Let's see, one of the exhibits that you 
identified when you were, I think waiting to talk to James at 
8 the hospital, or maybe (inaudible), maybe it was right after 
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you started to interview him. By the way, in that interview, 
once he came to his senses, is it fair to say he was 
cooperative with the interview? 
A Yes, very much so. 
Q All right. There is an exhibit, I think two 
exhibits, 73 and 74, that show pictures of James' hands, 
clearly with some abrasions on his - on one or both of the 
hands. Do you remember that exhibit? 
I do. Yes. A 
Q And, is it - isn't it correct that when you ask him 
about his hands, and the broken - the one that was broken, 
was that he told you that that was from hitting the wall. 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Okay. Just wanted to make that clear. Thank you. 
You also asked him some questions about whether he was trying 
to clean up the apartment at some point. Just some general 
questions about cleaning. @ 
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A Yes. 
Q Just to kind of focus your attention on what I'm 
going to ask about. And just for clarification, the - when 
he was talki~g about the taking some - I mean, you asked him 
5 if - you remember taking some peroxide and some first aid 
6 stuff to try cleaning up? Do you remember asking him that 
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question? 
A 
Q 
I do. 
All right. And he's - and you're asking, was that 
before or after she lost consciousness, and he says that was 
before? 
A That could've been. I honestly don't remember. 
you - if I can refer to my -
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yeah, sure. Look at page -
- transcript, what page is that? 
20 of the interview -
Page 20? 
Yeah, X. 1. 00020. 
Okay. 
At maybe line 551. 
Okay. 
If 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
So, is it - that was before she lost consciousness? 
Yes. 
Q Okay. And he was trying to - and you had elicited 
the test - you testified about his admission that he had 
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backhanded her, and that's what made her nose bleed, do you 
remember that? 
A Correct, yes. 
Q And that he was trying to - trying to get - trying 
to slow the blood, or stop the blood, but it kept running? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Okay. I think you were pretty clear 
about this, let me go ahead and ask you anyway. You 
testified that James had admitted beating Angela and hurting 
her in a number of ways, hitting, kicking, and choking. 
correct, however, that when you asked him if he used any 
weapons, that he s~id that he did not. 
A Yes. 
It's 
Q Okay. Okay. Let's see. Oh. One of the things 
that you asked James about was whether - what Angela was 
saying to him during this assault, and I'm pretty sure that 
your answer was - and tell me if I got it wrong, that he said 
she wasn't saying much, she was just screaming. 
A That sounds right. 
Q All right. It sounds right, but it's not entirely 
true, is it? 
A. That's what he told me. 
Q Okay. Well, let's look at the - let's look at the 
interview again. Let me direct you to page 8. 
-------------------t---
A Okay. 
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1 Q And just look at page 8 for a minute, go ahead and 
2 read down there a little ways, it's double spaced, so it 
3 shouldn't take long. 
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A I don't see on this page where I asked James what 
she was saying. Is there a line that you're referencing? 
Q No, I'm just - I want to make sure we're looking at 
the same page. Yeah. No, I don't - I mean, I'm just saying, 
you testified that that's what he answered. And now I'm 
going to direct your attention to some details here about 
what he said she said, other than what you said he said she 
said. 
A Okay. 
Q And you said, she didn't say much, she's just 
screaming. In fact -
MR. BOEHM: The State -
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. BOEHM: - would like to raise an objection at 
18 this moment, Your Honor. He's indicated that he intends to 
19 
20 
21 
22 
ask statements that this alleged victim, Angela Jenkins, 
made. Those are clearly hearsay, and we would object on that 
basis. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Your Honor, I would like to 
23 confront this witness, who has misrepresented the facts of 
24 the case, and this cross examination will expose his bias and 
________ .__ _______________ , ___ , __ .. _, ____________________________ -t-__ 
25 his omission of critical facts. 
i 
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THE COURT: Counsel, approach. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:) 
MR. BOEHM: Page 8 is the statements that 
(inaudible) to his opening statement, apparently trying to 
elicit testimony with this witness regarding statements 
(inaudible) talked about regarding (inaudible). 
MR. DELLAPIANA: As we always do when we cross 
examine somebody about what they testified about, that's -
MR. BOEHM: The State, in its direct examination of 
this witness paid very careful attention to that transcript, 
and I went through it in fine detail about if any statement 
(inaudible) . 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Nope. 
MR. BOEHM: Their - the (inaudible) that defense 
counsel's talking about, she didn't say much, comes from a 
much later page, I think it's 24 or 25, something that was 
discussed. And she said - he asked - he asked something 
about what she was saying (inaudible), she didn't say 
anything (inaudible). 
MR. DELLAPIANA: So they elicited that testimony. 
That is not a complete, accurate statement. 
MR. BOEHM: We didn't introduce any statement of 
(inaudible). Screaming is not a statement. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: You asked if she had said anything, 
and he said no. 
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MR. BOEHM: I don't think what was said - what did 
she say? 
THE COURT: No, the question was - came in, when you 
were strangling her, did - it was in that context that the 
5 question was posed. Not, did she say anything at any tiMe? 
6 
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If you had -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, that's the - but that's the 
(inaudible) impression -
THE COURT: If you're seeking to introduce 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: - hearsay, unless you can give me an 
exception, it's not corning in. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well -
THE COURT: It's not coming in. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: The confrontation clause. 
THE COURT: The confrontation clause has - you're 
not eliciting statements of any individual that is accus~ng 
him of anything at this point - you're introducing the 
statements of somebody else, and that what you're seeking to 
do. They're not his statements. You can confront him about 
his own statements. As I understand the confrontation 
clause, eliciting somebody else's statements is not part of 
23 it. 
24 MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, he's misrepresenting what she 
--------,--------- ·····------···--------------------------,-~ 
25 said. 
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THE COURT: Okay -
MR. BOEHM: He didn't - I can voir dire the witness 
and we can direct (inaudible). We can even recall him from 
(inaudible). We never introduced a statement of Angela 
Jenkins (inaudible). 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I've got some other things while 
we're standing here. I'm convinced that the right to cross 
examine is more than adequate for this situation, but Rule 
106, the completeness rule, when a party introduces part of a 
recorded statement - this was a recorded statement -
THE COURT: I do (inaudible), the completeness rule 
speaks to completing that statement, where only a fragment of 
the statement is brought in, not to bring in something that 
is pages away from the statement that -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I disagree. 
THE COURT: - was allegedly brought in. So -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I disagree. 
THE COURT: - as I see the completeness rule is, if 
you're asking someone to read a fraction of a statement, and 
that statement on its own or that - without introducing ~he 
complete - that whole complete statement, it leaves a 
misleading indication, then the completeness rule applies. 
But, to seek -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I - that's where we are. 
THE COURT: No, we're talking about something that 
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you're telling him is page - something arising on page 8. 
This statement - the statement you were referencing is, I'm 
being told is on page 24. I don't know, I don't have those 
in front of me. But, based on that, I don't believe that: the 
completeness rule applies. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well ... 
THE COURT: So, if that's your basis -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I'm going to ask the question 
in a different way. 
THE COURT: Well -
MR. DELLAPIANA: If he wants to -
THE COURT: - you better clear it through me. 
MR. BOEHM: Yeah, I would ask for that (inaudible) 
that he can't just (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yeah. No. I don't - I don't want this 
tainting the jury. You tell me what it is that you're going 
to ask. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay. Well, I'm going to ask a 
question regarding Mr. Sanchez's explanation for the - for 
20 the assault. 
21 THE COURT: Then -
MR. BOEHM: (Inaudible) -22 
23 MR. DELLAPIANA: This is something that goes to his 
24 own statement. Regardless of the truth of whether - of 
25 anything she said, he believed -
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l THE COURT: Then it doesn't - but it's not a 
2 statement against the party. It's his own statement that is 
3 arguably self serving. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, that's for the jury to -
THE COURT: If he wants to take the stand and say 
it, then that's fine. But -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, tell you what, we can spend 
the rest of the afternoon with me cross examining this guy on 
the record and send it up on appeal then, because that's the 
defense. That's our defense. 
MR. BOEHM: I mean, we filed a motion in limine that 
was - talked about the 412, we talked about this yesterday, 
everybody knew that this was going to be a tactic that might 
be employed, but I think that everybody has to recognize that 
either one doesn't allow the statement unless it's offered 
against (inaudible), defense counsel represents the defendant 
17 (inaudible) cannot ask this witness -
18 MR. DELLAPIANA: I think we used that argument. 
19 THE COURT: Yes, you did. 
20, MR. DELLAPIANA: I'm - (inaudible), I specifically 
21 said, I am not using a party opponent language rule as a way 
22 to introduce a statement of my client. I -
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: That's true, what you said is that you 
would elicit it through somebody else's testimony. And what 
I said to you is, if you're seeking to introduce it through 
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l , somebody else, it needs to be consistent with the rules of 
2 evidence, and it cannot be a statement of the individual. I 
3; said - and I also said that if you, you know, clearly he has 
4 the right to testify, he clearly has a right not to testify. 
5 l But, if he - if you want to put that in, you're not eliciting 
6 [ it on the basis of hearsay. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, tell you what, Your Honor. 
will attempt to ask some different questions about different 
things, and then when I'm done with what is hopefully 
unobjectionable testimony, I'll either - I'll bring it to 
11 I everybody 1 s attention that I'm ready to make -
I 
12 i THE COURT: We will discuss this off the record with 
13 
14 
15 
16 
the jury - out of the presence -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah. Okay. 
THE COURT: - of -
MR. BOEHM: Well, and my concern is that - I mean, 
1 7 t the Court's asking what he - what defense counsel intends to 
18 I ask, because defense counsel seems unfortunately opposed to 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the Court 1 s ruling, and I think -
MR. DELLAPIANA: True. Anyway, go ahead. 
MR. BOEHM: Right? And I think the issue is, 
there's a very big difference between what (inaudible) 
yesterday when the State asked a question and got an 
unexpected response, it was not elicited by the State's 
question. And defense counsel thinks he's going to say, 
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Well, what did defendant say about this? (Inaudible) say 
about this, and explain that it - the cat's out of the bag, I 
3 and he's done it intentionally, and knowing that it's not 
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admissible, that it's hearsay and that it can't be used. 
I would ask for a warning that he not do that. 
THE COURT: Don't tempt me, Mr. Dellapiana. 
So 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I can't - I'll tell you - I'm going 
to do my best -
THE COURT: Your responsibility is - you need to 
your responsibility is to put in, if you wish to put in 
evidence that would support a - by a preponderance of the 
evidence a standard that you've (inaudible} on some basis. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Sure. 
THE COURT: Admissible evidence. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Right. 
THE COURT: But, you're not going to be introducing 
or leading into something that would be objectionable 
statements. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: We'll see. 
THE COURT: Just to get that on the record -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I will try. 
THE COURT: - that will not happen. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I will try not to do that. 
THE COURT: No. No. You will not do that. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I may end up the afternoon with my 
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client in custody, but not on trial. 
(End of sidebar) 
MR. BOEHM: Your Honor, can we just make a finding 
that the State has objected based on the hearsay and hear 
what the Court's ruling on that -
THE COURT: The State has objected; I have sustained 
the objection. 
MR. BOEHM: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Okay. This cross examination 
may be shorter than I intended. 
The length of the fight - you asked him about how 
long the fight went on. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I did. 
And he said it was for a couple of hours. 
Yes. 
You described it as last - him saying another time 
17 it was last night. Do you remember that? 
18 A I do. 
19 Q Okay, is that fair to - for most people that can 
20 mean sometime before dawn? I mean, we refer to - oh, it 
21 happened last night, could be in the middle of the night. 
22 A I - I would assume so. Yeah. 
23 1 
24 I 
Q All right. You asked him about - he told you that 
he had choked her and that she kind of lost consciousness, 
i ------------------ ·-···--·--·---------------------:---
25 1· right? 
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A He said a little bit. ~ think those were his 
words, yeah. 
Q In any case, he - when it looked like she was 
losing consciousness, he would breathe for her. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Like, did you get that as some kind of 
attempt at CPR or -
A I asked him specifically, because I was confused 
myself, and he just repeated that he breathed for her. I 
asked him if he performed CPR, meaning chest compressions, 
and he said, no, just - he just breathed for her. So I said, 
mouth to mouth? And he nodded his head or something like 
that, I can't remember. 
Q Okay. All right. Good. Let me ask you about the 
- the last time - you gave some testimony about the last time 
she lost consciousness. 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And he said, this - I think you said - testified 
that he said it was something around eight or nine o'clock in 
the morning? 
A That's what he told me, yes. 
Q All right. And that it was - and that was after 
she took the pills, that's when it started. Remember that? 
A I remember him telling me that she took some pills, 
and I think that was at the beginning of the interview, 
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towards the - towards the first part, I asked - the first 
time I asked him if he - if she lost consciousness, he said 
she took some methadone, and then she lost consciousness, was 
in that same area of the interview. 
Q Right, and there were - then they were laying down, 
and - and do you want to look at page 9, just in case you 
want to see what I'm looking at? 
A Okay. 
Q You said, did she ever pass out and lose 
consciousness, and that's at line 250, right? 
A Yes. 
Q And he says, Well, she took a lot of pills, though, 
too. After she took the pills, then it started." Got that? 
A He said, "a little bit, and then - "well, she took 
a lot of pills, too. After she took the pills, it started." 
Yes. 
Q Then it started. Okay. And we're laying there, 
and she -
MR. BOEHM: Your Honor, I'm going to object again. 
I think that what he's trying to do again is use hearsay 
that's inappropriate, coming from -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Hearsay? 
MR. BOEHM: - the lips of his own client, subject to 
801, it's not being used against the party opponent, and so 
it's inadmissible. 
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MR. DELLAPIANA: This provides context for the 
direct examination. 
THE COURT: Counsel, please approach again. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: What are we talking about now? 
MR. BOEHM: What - I'm not sure he's - I don't want 
(inaudible), but -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Page (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: What -
MR. DELLAPIANA: He talked about the last time that 
she lost consciousness was when he choked her. Here, in the 
interview, it says the last time she lost 
after she took the pills. 
MR. BOEHM: And that's -
consciousness was 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And they went to sleep, but then he 
woke up, he realized she was non-responsive, and he called 
the police. 
MR. BOEHM: Okay -
MR. DELLAPIANA: That was totally misrepresented. 
MR. BOEHM: This already came in on direct, so I 
don't know (inaudible) statement, and so I think (inaudible) 
did he lay down with her? Yeah, that's what he told me, 
23 (inaudible) gets three or four more questions about what his 
24 client said, I think (inaudible). 
25 MR. DELLAPIANA: He's the one that's asked -
I 136 
I 
L----·-····-------·- ·-·-·-----····-- ·-· -- - ....... ··•········-····· ·•-·····--·-·--·------·-·-·-----··-------·····•···-·-·--------------~ 
I~ 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 i 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
elicited evidence about what my client said. 
MR. BOEHM: We don't need (inaudible) -
MR. DELLAPIANA: And we have to have -
THE COURT: Please -
MR. DELLAPIANA: - the context of -
THE COURT: - keep -
MR. DELLAPIANA: - leaving important things out. 
MR. BOEHM: We've already elicited the testimony 
that your client laid down with her after she lost 
consciousness. I mean (inaudible) -
MR. DELLAPIANA: And you don't want me to ask any 
questions about it. 
MR. BOEHM: It's the statements that I'm concerned 
14 about. 
15 THE COURT: No, you can't. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay, whatever you say, I'll 
attempt-
MR. BOEHM: You can clarify that by saying that, 
during direct examination you testified that my client said 
20 he laid down, is that correct? Yes. I mean, you're trying 
21 
22 
to get (inaudible) the statements of your client. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Explain - get the rest of the 
23 context of what he said, other than the little bit that he -
24 THE COURT: Okay, and you want - and your question, 
----------- ------·-------• 
25 what is the question you want to pose? 
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Isn't it true that he said it was 
after that she took the pills, is when she lost 
consciousness? 
THE COURT: I thought you already did ask that. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I asked that, and what was it that 
he said? Well, then I was going to say, and then they laid 
down, and then he woke up, and she - he found her non-
responsive, and then he called the police. 
THE COURT: I will allow that. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: (inaudible) question. 
MR. BOEHM: Fair enough. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
(End of 3idebar) 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, if we keep doing it like 
this, maybe it will take a long time. But -
MR. BOEHM: The State would withdraw its objection. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. DELLAPIANA) So, I was asking about what you 
testified about on direct examination, about Angela losing 
consciousness, and we just had got through the part where you 
actually read the - from the transcript, and just because we 
were interrupted, and I want to get back to where we were, 
she said, after - he said, uAfter she took the pills, then it 
started,u right? 
A Yes. 
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0 After - okay. And, we were laying, and she kind of 
wasn't breathing, right, or wasn't responding to me, right? 
A Yes. 
Q And I was all - uwhen I woke up, that's all I 
5 remember," right? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
"So I called the cops." 
Yes. 
After the - you had two interviews with him, right? 
I had one and then we took a break and then we 
continued the same one. 
Q Oh, same one. Okay. In between the break, or 
after the break, you asked him if he wanted to ask any 
questions? 
A Yes. 
Q He asked you, in effect, is she okay? Did she make 
it? 
A Yes. 
Q And you obviously told him that she had not. 
A Right. 
Q And, fair to say that he took that pretty hard. 
A What do you mean by -
MR. BOEHM: Objection, calls for speculation. Also 
24 calls for, again, probably a statement by the defendant. 
25 
i 
I 
! 
THE COURT: I think it is a bit speculative. Why 
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don't you -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Be more specific? 
THE COURT: Just - no, just as to whatever physical 
reaction Mr. Sanchez may have demonstrated. 
Q (BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Physical reaction, I don't 
6 know. I mean, did he appear to you to be suicidal? 
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A Physically? I don't know how you assess that. 
mean, for someone that's suicidal, I don't know how you 
physically assess that unless they're committing acts. 
Q Well, he asked you to shoot him, would that be 
evidence that he's -
MR. BOEHM: Again, objection, this is hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. BOEHM: Move to strike. 
THE COURT: It will be stricken. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
THE CO0RT: Counsel, please approach. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: I believe I may have limited Mr. 
I 
Dellapiana in that - in that last interchange a little b~t 
more than I had intended to. I narrowed it to physical 
response. I think I would allow any description of emotional 
response that the defendant may have displayed. 
going to allow the State - or specific statements 
(inaudible) . 
But I'm not 
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MR. BOEHM: And I think that's fine. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, so you're welcome to pursue that, 
if you wish. Because you're (inaudible) question was -
Q 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay. 
THE COURT: - (inaudible). 
(End of sidebar) 
(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Let me jump back to where we 
were a minute ago when I was asking you about James' response 
to your informing him that Angela had passed away, and I -
and I said, fair to say he took it pretty hard, and what was 
your answer, or what is your answer to that? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
He did appear distraught. 
Okay. 
He appeared distraught after I told him that, yes. 
All righ~. Fair enough. I want to ask you about 
17 something like totally unrelated to the interview of James 
18 Sanchez, and it's something that is related to your interview 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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of Roger Gary Warner, which is in section 3, around about 
page 1 7. If you want to switch -
A I'm going to have to - yeah, open this book up 
here. I'm sorry, what page, sir? 
Q Seventeen. 
A Okay. 
Q And you were here and saw me asking questions of 
. -·· ····•--•----··---•- --·· -·--··-·-·-·•------·------·-······--··-·--·----·----···-•--·- -----•····--1 ~ ~ _ J 
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Mr. Warner about how - what the emotional state of James was 
when James called Gary to come and get him, and you remember, 
I asked - and Gary didn't remember, and I said, Gary, do you 
remember being interviewed by Detective Reyes, and he said, 
yeah, I remember that. And then I said, do you remember 
telling Detective Reyes that James was crying? And he says -
A 
Q 
I do remember your questions, sir. 
- and he says, this was three years ago, I don't 
remember if I said that. Is that what he told you three 
years ago? That James was crying? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And you - I mean, this interview, this was written 
like - this was done within hours of - a couple hours of the 
arrest, right? 
A 
it's not 
yes. 
Q 
-~ 
This is actually a transcript of a recording, so 
a report, so it is word for word from a recording, 
All right. And the recording was made -
Made at the time of the interview. 
Q All right, which was, itself, within an hour or two 
of the arrest. 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Very well. 
If I can have just a minute, Judge? 
----------------t---
T HE COURT: Certainly. 
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Your Honor, I don't have any 
further questions for - let me put it this way, I have some 
further questions for Detective Reyes, but I'm not going to 
ask them at this time. 
THE COURT: Fair enough. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And suggest we have a recess. 
THE COURT: Fair enough. 
Do we have redirect? 
MR. BOEHM: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed. 
11 i REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 i BY MR. BOEHM: 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Q There's a couple of, I guess we could call them 
housecleaning issues, and then I'll just ask you a couple of 
questions about what you've been asked. You saw when Derrick 
Cutler testified, and he talked about a match, but there was, 
you know, multiple sources on a pillow. The jury has seen 
18 i pictures of -
19 MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, I'm going to object. This 
20 ! seems well beyond the scope of my cross examination. Matches 
21 i on a pillow? 
22 MR. BOEHM: And this is just for clarification, and 
23 I if-
24 ! MR. DELLAPIANA: Of what? 
25 MR. BOEHM: Okay. Fair enough. 
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THE COURT: No. Sustained. 
(BY MR. BOEHM) Defense asked you about the phone 
3 calls, the 9-1-1 calls. Did the defendant admit to you 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
during his interview that he made those phone calls? 
A Yes. 
Q When the defendant suggested to you that he was 
cleaning her up to render her physical aid, what portion of 
the interview was that in? 
I believe it was right about the center. I can't 
be sure without referring back. 
Q Okay. Defendant - or defense counsel asked you 
about Narcan. What is Narcan? 
A It 1 s a substance that is given to individuals who 
have overdosed on Jpiates, so heroin, methadone, those types 
of narcotics, and its function is to inhibit the effects of 
opiates, so as Dr. Reese was talking about suppressing the 
nervous system, suppressing respirations, and so forth, the 
18 Narcan inhibits that reaction from the opiates, and so, 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
effectively stops an overdose. 
Q And did you witness the defendant receive Narcan? 
A I did. 
Q And did you ask him about the effects of the Narcan 
on him? 
A I did. 
Q And what did he say? 
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He said at first he thought that he was having some 
sort of reaction because the effects were so instantaneous, 
and then he started to feel better afterwards. 
Q 
A 
Q 
And that was before you interviewed him. 
Yes. 
Defense counsel asked you about the loss of 
consciousness, and I'd like to be really clear about that. 
Was there more than one time in your interview with the 
defendant that he referred to loss of consciousness? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Several -
(Inaudible) Jenkins? 
Several times. 
And when he talked about the loss of consciousness 
and the - the effect of pills that Angela Jenkins had taken, 
what part of the interview was that? 
A The very first part. 
Q Okay. And so as the interview progressed, and he 
talked about her loss of consciousness later in the 
interview, did he talk about the pills any more? 
No. 
Q In fact, when you got to the end of your interview, 
did you also talk to him about her loss of consciousness? 
A And I believe that conversation - or that part of 
24 the conversation was very clear, talking about the last time 
25 she lost consciousness where she never woke up again. 
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Q And directly preceding her loss of consciousness, 
he talked about strangling her. 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And that was with his forearm. 
A Yes. 
Q Defense counsel asked you if, during this - well, 
after this break, if the defendant was distraught. Was there 
any way for you to know what the defend~nt was distraught 
about? 
A 
Q 
No. @ 
So, he could've been distraught about his own 
circumstances. 
A Yes. 
MR. BOEHM: No further questions. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DELLAPIANA: 
Q Just briefly, (inaudible) some questions here about 
the order of the interview. Isn't it true that you kind of 
jumped back and forth, and repeated questions about different 
things that happened? Like, the beginning and the middle and 
the end? I mean, you - for example, his first answer to you 
- you said what happened, he says, well - I won't include the 
whole conversation, ufor some particular reason I got mad at 
her, I hit her, thumped her, I guess, and then I called the 
police." 
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A Yes. 
Q Which kind of, I mean, covers the whole series of 
the - the assault, right? 
A 
Q 
Not in the slightest. And that's why I asked him -
Well, I mean, it covers the time frame. Let me 
6 rephrase. It covers from the beginning to the end of the 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
time frame in one sentence, basically. 
A 
Q 
In, I guess, the most vague sense possible, yes. 
Oh, it's not very specific. I mean, it's specific, 
I was angry, I hit her, I called the police, that's specific, 
right? 
A 
Q 
I hit her, I thumped her, I called the police, is -
Specific, just not detailed. 
A I guess it would depend on definition of thumped 
her. Thumped her - if thumped her meant a wide variety of 
different assaulting injuries, then maybe that would be 
specific and all encompassing. 
Q Okay. 
A I - I'm sorry, sir, I'm not trying to be - I j,1st -
I don't know exactly what you're - what you're meaning by, 
those three words are specific to the entire event. 
Q They're specific, they're just not detailed. My 
point is that after that you went into detail and different -
24 and repeated things over and over, and, you know, asked lots 
25 of questions, and -
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A Yes. 
Q All right. I mean - and some of the questions and 
answers were at the beginning, and some were in the middle, 
and some were at the end. It's not really a - yeah. Never 
mind. Withdraw the question. I think it's obvious. 
Nothing further at this time. 
THE COURT: Do the members of the jury have any 
questions of this witness? Okay, please write it down. 
Counsel, please approach. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
(Inaudible conversation) 
THE COURT: Actually, counsel? I think that - I 
think what I'm going to say is that it's not (inaudible), 
because it goes into a question - into contact that occurred 
at another time, and that's not relevant to the -
(Inaudible conversation) 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: All right. I am declining to ask that 
question as we all concur it's not a legally permissible 
question. Okay? 
MR. BOEHM: The State has no further questions for 
this witness, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may step 
down. 
----------------------·--
MR. REYES: Thank you. 
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THE COURT: And then, it is about time for a break 
anyway, so we will take a recess. You're admonished, again, 
do not discuss the case with anyone or allow anyone to 
discuss it in your presence. Do not attempt to investigate 
anything about the case. Do not make up your mind about 
anything, or anything about - related to the evidence until 
all of the evidence has been received and the matter is 
8 turned over to you for deliberation. 
9 Please rise for the jury. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: All right, you may be seated. 
Mr. Dellapiana? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: So, those questions are all -
THE COURT: These will all become part of the 
record, absolutely. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay. Very good. 
So, I had two reasons for requesting the recess. 
One is that I'd like, in order to make a proffer for the 
record, I wanted to go ahead and ask the questions I'd 
20 anticipated asking without the jury present, just to make a 
21 record, and then we're going to need to have a little bit 
22 more time to talk about -
23 THE COURT: Mr. Sanchez's -
24 MR. DELLAPIANA: Something else. +· 
-~~------------ ~----------------
THE COURT: - decisions. 25 ! 
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Yes. So, if we - kind of 
suggesting, unless somebody wants a break right now, we'll 
just him (inaudible) take a break. 
THE COURT: Detective Reyes, if you'll take the 
stand, please. And again, you're reminded you're still under 
oath. And this is solely for purposes of proffer. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Correct. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DELLAPIANA: 
Q All right. You had testified that James Sanchez 
told you that he'd gotten mad at Angela Jenkins and began to 
assault her; is that correct? 
Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). A 
Q All right. He also told you why he'd gotten mad at 
her, right? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
That because he thought -
MR. BOEHM: Can I object? I just want to make sure 
- we're just making this record so that he has a record for 
his appeal and for -
THE COURT: That is correct. 
MR. BOEHM: Okay. Then I won't make any further 
objections. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOEHM: Thank you. 
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1 MR. DELLAP!ANA: And we should probably also note 
2 our - the reasons for the objection at this point, you want 
3 i to go ahead and say why you objected t.o this line of 
4 questioning we're about to try to engage in? 
5 MR. BOEHM: Right. And the State's objection was 
6 that he's trying to admit his own client's statement through 
7 this detective. Normally if you're trying to admit an out of 
8 court statement from a non-testifying witness, you have to 
9' meet some exemption of the hearsay rule. The most common 
10 
11 
that we see is under 801 when you're asking for the statement 
of an opponent's - or an opponent's statement. In this case, 
12 the defense counsel is asking the State's witness about his 
13 i own client's testimony. It's not an opponent, and so it's a 
14 . self-serving statement, and we don't believe that it fiL; 
15 under any rules or exemptions to the rules of hearsay. it's 
16 inadmissible, therefore, this doesn't help to complete any 
17 statements. The State was very careful in maneuvering around 
18 I any statements that the defendant made regarding what the 
19 alleged victim, Angela Jenkins, might have said, or any 
20 1 statements that he might have said, that were:1 't inculpatory. 
21 MR. DELLAPIANA: And the defense believes that these 
22 - this line of questioning is admissible under the Sixth 
2 3 P•JT1endment and the defendant's r iqht to confront and cross 
i 
I 
! 24 1 examine the witnesses, in particular on direct examination, 
--------- : ____ ➔- ---•• ----------- ----•---• -- ----•--- r-•-
---·-1 ___ _ 
" 25 i the State had elicited evidence that, in the defense's I I 
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perspective, omitted facts that should be - we should be able 
to require in our cross examination to provide - and also the 
defense has cited the Rule 106, Rule of Completeness, which I 
4 : believe i~ general provides that when one party introduces 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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16 
17 
18 
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part of a statement, the other party can introduce other 
parts of the statement, or the whole statement even, 
necessary to provide context or as in otherwise - otherwise 
relevant to the direct - part of the statement previously 
offered, even if it's not in the same little part of the 
statement. 
THE COURT: And with respect to the claim regarding 
the Rule of Completeness, and I'm trying to pull up that 
rule, since I don't seem to have my copy of the rules present 
- oh, there it is. I had concluded that the Rule of 
Completeness goes to when there is a fragment of a sentence, 
or a fragment of a paragraph, that is being introduced, but 
in fairness, to get a full context of that - of the import of 
that limited statement, the whole statement should be read, 
then that's when the Rule of Completeness applies. And ~t 
does not necessarily - I do not believe that it's implicated 
when we are addressing parts of an interview that are, as was 
represented to me, 20 or more pages apart, that that is not 
implicating the Rule of Completeness, as I understand it. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Defense also offered these - the 
content of these - defendant cross examination under Rule 
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l 803-4, it goes tc the defendant's state of mind. 
2 Let me add a little bit more explanation to that 
3 argument than we made at the brief bench conference. And 
4 that is that, as a - in regards to - I think that 803-4 in 
5 1 and of itself is a hearsay exception. 
6 THE COURT: Correct. 
7 MR. DELLAPIANA: But I also would like to offer this 
8 information under - as offering it not necessarily for the 
9 I truth 0£ the matter, in which case it's not hearsay at all, 
10 but to explain Mr. Sanchez's action. Since I didn't clearly 
11 make that argument at the bench, I'd like to give the State a 
12 ! chance to respond to that one before I go any further. 
13 MR. BOEHM: I haven't looked up Rule 803, and I want 
14 I to look that up before I make my response. But I would 
15 respond directly to the assertion that it's not a hearsay 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
statement because it's not offered for the truth. Clearly 
he's offering that to show that the defendant believed that 
Ms. Jenkins had some type of affair with someone other - that 
would cause him to feel that way. Otherwise, he wouldn't 
have felt that way. So, I can't imagine how it's not being 
offered for the truth of the statement. 
THE COURT: And I would say that under 803, parens 
23 I 3, the rule provides a statement of the declarant's then 
24 
25 
existing state of mind, but not including a statement of t' 
memory or belief t~ prove the fact believed, which I believe j 
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is exactly what Mr. Dellapiana's seeking to introduce it for . 
So, I do not believe that it falls within the then existing 
state of mind exception. 
MR. BOEHM: I have nothing further to add. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And then, Judge, I - did you 
already address the (inaudible) to explain his conduct, 
provide context, and not necessarily for the truth of whether 
she was having an affair, but that that was his belief, and 
so that's what made him angry, what made him assault her? 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm not following you. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: So, that was 801 - I think it's C2, 
that says that a statement which is not offered for the truth 
of the matter is not hearsay. Right? So, I'm offering - I 
want to offer either - want to elicit that James either just 
said he believed, that's what he believed, he was - that she 
was having an affair, and that she had, in fact, admitted it, 
or at least he said that she admitted it to him, and that's 
what made him so angry. That is it not for the truth of 
whether she had an - the affair or not, but to explain his 
20 ' subsequent conduct and -
21 THE COURT: Well, then I think you bring it exactly 
22 
23 
24 
25 
under 803-3, and it does not respond to - it's - it cannot be 
admissible for a statement of belief. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I think it's a separate 
argument, and I'm offering it as a separate argument. 
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THE COURT: Okay, then I apologize. I'm missing 
your argument. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well ... 
THE COURT: On the one hand, you're saying that you 
are not asserting it - that is non-hearsay because you're net 
asserting it for the truth of the matter, right? You're 
arguing that? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah, can I just give you a series 
of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine Utah 
cases that give some examples of matters offered not for the 
truth? I mean, I think if it's - at least an important 
enough issue that, while we're still in trial, that we look 
at it. 
THE COURT: Okay, let me see them. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: They're these - some of these·-
some of them don't have a lot of details, but -
it. 
THE COURT: Has counsel seen that -
MR. DELLAPIANA: No. 
THE COURT: - whatever you're providing me? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: No, he's going to make a copy of 
(Inaudible) Utah cases. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. DELLAPIANA: By the way, co-counsel's pulled up 
24 803-3 for me, and I think I can - like to make a distinction. 
25 We'd be offering - so 803-3 says that the statement of the 
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declarant's state of mind, such as motive, which we're 
talking about, is -
THE COURT: But not including. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: But not including a statement of 
5 memory or belief to prove the fact - remember, that is to 
6 
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13 
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prove that she had an affair, I'm not providing it to prove 
that she had an affair, but just to show his motive. 
THE COURT: Or to prove the fact believed. Unless 
it relates to the validity of terms of a declarant's will. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I'm not trying to prove that she 
had a -
THE COURT: You're seeking to introduce it for 
purposes of establishing -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Motive. 
THE COURT: - the declarant's belief, right? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Motive. Yeah. But the fact, 
remember to believe is that he had believed is that she had 
an affair. I'm not trying to prove that she had an affair, 
just that that was his belief and this is an exception under 
rule 803-3, goes to his motive. 
MR. BOEHM: I don't read 803-3 the same way. And I 
think that we need to be careful that we're talking about 
more than one statement, and so I think it becomes that much 
more complex. I think, if I'm thinking of the correct part 
of this - this part of the interview, defense counsel wa~1ts 
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to get into - and this is where we initially raised the 
objection, he wants to get into what the alleged victim, 
Angela Jenkins, told his client, and what his client said in 
response. 
5 l Now, he wants to use that statement to show that 
6 I his client believed something was true, that Angela had an 
7 
8 
9 
10 
affair, and he's using it in an inappropriate way, as the 
Court has pointed out, under 803-3, that he's trying to prove 
the fact remembered. He's not trying to show what his state 
of mind was when he was being interviewed by this detective. 
11 i He's trying to show, you know, this issue of the statement, 
12 I memory, or belief, to prove the fact remembered or believed. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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I think it's clear that it is a statement that's being 
offered for its truth, and that it's not being offered to 
show his - as it says, then existing state of mind. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: If I can respond to that? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I think, just within the context of 
803-3, I would not be allowed to try to elicit statements 
20 l purportedly made by Angela Jenkins. Instead, I think I could 
21 l - al though I think it's admissible under either the 
22 completeness rule or the right to confront witnesses. But, 
23 under 803-3, I think I can elicit that James indicated that 
24 he'd got in a fight because he thought Angela was cheating on 
25 him with his brother Joshua. Whether it's true or not, 
~57 
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1 that's what he thought and that's his motive for assaulting 
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her. 
THE COURT: I guess what I don't see that you're 
addressing is the second part of 803-3, which says that, but 
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the 
fact believed. Maybe I'm missing this, and maybe I need to 
go and do a little bit more research on that. But, that's 
what I'm focusing on, and I'm not understanding. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I think the fact believed, 
that I'm not trying to prove, is that Angela Jenkins had an 
affair with his brother. I think that's - that's why I say, 
12 I don't think I can put on Angela - through this rule Angela 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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19 · 
20 
21 
22 
23 
ii 24 
l 
Jenkins' statements of admitting that she had an affair. T .J.. 
can say that he believed it, that that fact is true, and I'm 
not offering to prove that it was true, just to give - just 
to show his motive. 
THE COURT: And the second part of that question is, 
at which point? The - at the time that he is being 
interviewed? It's the then existing state of mind, at the 
time of the interview, isn't it? I mean, what - what he was 
feeling at the time? I don't know. I'm asking you to -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I don't know, I -
THE COURT: - clarify your position - your position 
in terms of, which period of time are we addressing? When 
25 I he's in the process of being interviewed by Detective Reyes, 
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2 
3 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, that's when the statement is 
made. It's a statement of his motive. 
4 i THE COURT: So, it's then the then existing, right? 
5 MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, then is a little vague. I 
6 mean, if it's a statement about his existing state of mind, 
7 that then existed as the assault -
8 
9 
10 
break -
THE COURT: Okay. It sounds like I better take a 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah. 
11 THE COURT: - and go see what case law I can pull up 
12 I that clarifies that point. 
13 MR. DELLAPIANA: Right . 
MR. BOEHM: I would also like to point out that -
well, I mean, I'll let the Court do what it will, and then 
we'll respond to that, and I'll strike my statement. 
THE COURT: Well -
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
MR. BOEHM: Well, I just thi11k that we're trying to 
mix the words around. I think that the clear way for defense 
20 to put this testimony in - and there only really two ways. 
21 I Angela's deceased. So, she's one party to that. If it's 
22 true, in fact, that his brother had some type of sexual 
23 relationship, his brother can testify to that. He can also 
24 i testify to what he was specifically aware of what the 
25 defendant might have known about that relationship, if he 
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1 actually believed that the defendant was aware of that, or 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
the defendant can take the stand and say what it is that he 
believed at that point in time, and he can put it on that 
way. And I think that this rule, and all of these hearsay 
rules, are designed to make sure and protect the integrity of 
testimony, because in this case the statement again is not 
being offered against him, at the time that he made those 
8 statements he's obviously - there's a question of the 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1 ..., 
- _, 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
voracity of statements, and so that's the issue here, is 
there's a couple of ways to clear it up, and it's not through 
this detective. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, that wasn't very clear, but 
his argument seems to be that it's not being offered as a 
statement against a party opponent. And I'm not making that 
argument. So disregard that. 
THE COURT: Okay, so then your sole basis -
MR. DELLAPIANA: My - so far I've got them up to 
four, I've got another one. 
THE COURT: Well, then please - I - now you've 
really left me confused. So why don't you make it really 
21 i clear what your four bases are? 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay. 
THE COURT: And I will -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Right to confront witnesses under 
the Sixth Amendment, I think I can expose bias -
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THE COURT: Okay -
MR. DELLAPIANA: - bias by admission of what I would 
characterize as a misrepresentation of statements on direct 
examination. Number two, Rule of Completeness. Rule 106. 
And I think State versus Cruz Meza - and Meza is (inaudible) 
regard, which I believe allows me to - this is a recorded 
statement, not just a statement of oral recollection, so it's 
directly in - applicable under Rule 106. I believe that 
allows me to introduce the whole of the statement or main 
part of it, that's brought by opposing party, relevant to the 
part that they talk about. Doesn't have to be the same page -
THE COURT: What's your citation? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Cruz Meza. 
MR. BOEHM: I think I can give it to the Court -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I know, I got that from the State, 
I thought it was very helpful, it's right here. 
MR. BOEHM: 76P 3D 1165. 
THE COURT: Excuse me. What is it? 
MR. BOEHM: 76P 30 1165. I'm looking if I have a 
20 Utah (inaudible) -
21 THE COURT: Do you have a pinpoint? 
22 
23 
24 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Weli, I just had note (inaudible). 
MR. BOEHM: I -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I mean, it - actually the whole -
------~----------· ----- -- --------------------------------------t--
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
I 
I 
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MR. DELLAPIANA: - almost the entire thing talks 
about - the bulk of the opinion talks about the Rule of 
Completeness, so it's -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: - useful in that regard. 
THE COURT: Well -
MR. BOEHM: Well, and I would say to the Court that 
I believe it's a relatively brief opinion, but in my reading 
of it, and my sharing it with counsel, I think it - at least 
reading what the court held, the Supreme Court of Utah held 
that the trial court acted within its discretion under the 
doctrine of oral completeness, in refusing to admit 
exculpatory portion of defendant's oral statement in which he 
explained why he killed the victim. And I brought that 
because I ~hought that would be the perfect case if this 
situation came up. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: It's a perfect case for me. The 
reason the court h3d discretion in that case was because it 
was an oral recollection under Rule 611 -
MR. BOEHM: May I approach? 
THE COURT: And it was declined, right? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And not -
THE COURT: And it was affirmed -
MR. DELLAPIANA: - Rule 106 recorded statements. 
That's why. The court (inaudible). It's - they said that 
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doesn't apply in rule 106 cases, and rule - ours is a Rule 
106 case. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: So that was number two. Number 
three was 803-3, I believe that the statements goes - is an 
6 exception under the hearsay rule, because it goes to the 
7 
8 
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defendant's motive, which was that he thought Angela Jenkins 
was cheating on him with his brother, and I'm offering it to 
go to his motive, and not to prove whether Angela was 
cheating on him with his brother. That's number three. 
Number - number four was 801-C-2, this isn't even 
hearsay, because I'm not offering it for the truth of whether 
Angela was cheating on his brother, I think, but to explain 
his conduct. And there's - I've given the Court, and I guess 
we gave a copy to the State, of nine cases - Utah cases where 
all kinds of extraordinarily prejudicial information was 
admitted with this exception. I mean, "Oh, I talked to him, 
and the neighbor said that he'd committed a murder, so - but 
I - so I went over there to interview him." Like a fact. 
Like that kind of information, under this exception. 
THE COURT: That's the page you've just given me? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And then, did I say five - I think 
I said five. Let me just throw in there - haven't really 
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thought about this very much, sorry to say, but I think it 
goes to our right to present a defense, and this is our 
defense. So ... 
MR. BOEHM: Can I review this, just because I'll be 
looking at the cases while the court is, and hopefully be 
able to respond, I think I caught the confrontation clause, 
that was the first one. Pursuant to Rule 106 for the 
completeness of the statement, that was two. That it's not 
hearsay because it's not offered for truth, and therefore not 
subject to the rules against hearsay, not being a definition 
of 801, and then I think the most commonly referred to is 
that it falls under the exception in 803-3 for motive. 
that what the Court has? 
THE COURT: And I think he's also based bias, 
presumably under 608 -
specific -
MR. BOEHM: Okay. 
THE COURT: - C? 
MR. BOEHM: All right. Thank you. 
THE COURT: I'm assuming. He did not give me a 
Is 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I like that one. I adopt that one. 
THE COURT: I don't - it's not my role to provide 
you legal bases for your argument, counsel. 
MR. BOEHM: Your Honor, it's apparent to me that -
is there anything else that the defense wanted to raise? 
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Because it's - this sounds like it's going to take a while. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: This is going to - I mean, to 
seriously look at chis is going to take a while. We might 
want to -
just -
THE COURT: I'm thinking that we probably should 
MR. BOEHM: Let the jury go. 
THE COURT: - release the jury -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah. 
THE COURT: - for today, because we're going to need 
to resolve this issue, we also need to deal with jury 
instructions. 
MR. BOEHM: Correct. 
THE COURT: So -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Now, because Detective Reyes is 
sitting there, I mear1, the actual questions I was going to 
ask-
THE COURT: Oh (inaudible). 
MR. BOEHM: We never did get around to that, I 
guess, is that right? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And this -
THE COGRT: You've got the floor. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: This part, because we covered 
24 everything else, shouldn't take very long. I mean, it's 
25 ! clear the State -
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MR. BOEHM: We're going to stay silent. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: - objects to this line of 
questioning. 
THE COURT: Well, you did invite it. You said, why 
don't we let him put on the record his objections? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And I think appropriately so, ~ did 
that. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Dellapiana. 
Q (BY MR. DELLAPIANA) So we had just - you were 
talking about how James admitted that he had got in a fight 
with Angela Jenkins, right? 
A Right. 
Q And he told you why, right? 
A Yes. 
Q Said he started fighting with Angela because he 
thought she was cheating on him with her - his brother 
Joshua. 
A Correct. 
Q And this enraged him. 
A Yes. I don't know if he used the word enraged, 
honestly, I -
Q It's in your report, though, right? 
A Yes, probably. 
Q Okay. And then that's when he slugged her - well, 
I'll say that that's when he began the assault. 
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A Yes. 
Q All right. Now, he also claimed that she had made 
some statements, and this is - this goes to a few different 
pages, I'll tell you - you might recall them. And he said 
that she admitted it and she kept saying it. Remember that? 
It's on page 8. 
A I remember at first I thought that he just 
suspected her of it, and so I asked him about that, and she -
or he said that she was the one that told him that she was. 
So but not that - I don't remember him saying she kept 
repeating it. 
Q Oh, okay. Can you look at page 8 regarding she 
kept saying it? 
A Yeah, what - I'm sorry, what line is that? Okay, I 
see it. Yes, yes. She did. 
Q And that - then let's jump up to page 19, and you 
asked - let me see if I can get you to the line. 510. 
A Yes. 
Q And you say, and was she telling you she wouldn't 
cheat again, asking you to stop? Like stop the assault? 
A Right. 
Q Remember that - okay. Then he says, "No, I was 
23 telling her, please tell me that, but she wouldn't. She 
---+ 24 wouldn't tell me that. 25 j .. A Right. 
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Q uAnd that hurt my feelings." That's down at 520. 
The hurt the feeling statement -
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
- is that right? 
Yeah. 
Okay. I didn't hear you (inaudible). Let's see. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: That's it, I think I've made the 
record, Your Honor. Thank you very much for the opportunity. 
just ... 
THE COURT: You're welcome. 
MR. BOEHM: I might have -
THE COURT: Why don't we bring 
MR. BOEHM: - a question -
THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
in the jury -
MR. BOEHM: I may have a quick question. Let me 
THE COURT: Go ahead, counsel. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOEHM: 
Q Did the defendant ever tell you that he caught or 
physically viewed Ms. Jenkins having any type of a 
relationship with his brother? 
A No. 
Q And in specific, when he talked about what enraged 
him or what got him mad, was it the fact that she had cheated 
on him, or was it something else? 
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A She was playing games with him, she said - or, he -
he said that she admitted to him that she had been playing 
games or cheating with Josh. 
Q And, did the defendant tell you that Josh was there 
before this fight began? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Do you remember in line 238, it's on page 
8 nine, Roman numeral 10.01, again, number nine? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
A Yeah. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Would you just read the statement of the defendant 
at that point? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Your Honor, I've lost track 
(inaudible). 
Q 
A 
MR. BOEHM: Sorry, 238. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Go ahead and read it? 
(BY MR. BOEHM) Please. 
nwe were arguing a couple times, and my brother 
came, and I kind of pulled her hair and told her not to keep 
20 playing games with him, and it was over from there. Started 
21 choking her," and then it goes inaudible. 
22 MR. BOEHM: Okay. That's all (inaudible). Thank 
23 you. 
__ . __________ 2 .. :_j -···------T_H __ E_c_o_u_R_T_:_o_k_ay. All right. Let's bring in the 
25 jury and - so that I can inform them that I'll be releasing 
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them for the day. 
WITNESS: Do you want me to remain here, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: No, you may step down. 
(Whereupon the jury returned to the courtroom) 
THE COURT: All right, you may be seated. Ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury, I am going to need to take some 
time this afternoon to review some matters of law, and jury -
prepare jury instructions in conjunction with the attorneys. 
And so, I believe that it is going to take the balance of the 
day today. So, I am going to release you for the day, and we 
11 will begin tomorrow 9:00? 10:00? Do you think we need a bit 
12 more time? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
MR. DELLAPIANA: If we - well - I think by -
THE COURT: Let's -
MR. DELLAPIANA: - 10:00 -
THE COURT: Let's say 10:00. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Just to make sure that we're not keeping 
you waiting any longer than necessary. So, let me have you 
return by quarter to 10 tomorrow so again we can get started, 
hopefully by 10:00 we should be able to be ready to call you 
in. If there's any difference in that, I will let you know 
23 1 through the bailiff. But that way you're not having to wait 
24 for - you know - extended periods of time in the jury room. 
25 So again, I am reminding you as I have at every 
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time we've taken a break, you're not discuss this case with 
anyone, nor allow anyone to discuss it in your presence. 
You're not to attempt to research anything about this case, 
investigate anything, you must not listen to any news reports 
about this case, nor allow anyone to comment about any 
reports to you. Do not make up your mind about anything that 
has been presented to you until all of the evidence has been 
presented and the matter is turned over to you for 
deliberation. 
Please rise for the jury. 
(Whereupon the jury was excused for the day) 
THE COURT: All right. So, at this point, counsel, 
my clerk has printed out a number of the cases that Mr. 
Dellapiana has cited for me. I am going to be reviewing 
those as well as Cruz Meza, and some of the issues of law 
that we've been discussing. So we will be in recess for 
that. I also will need to meet with counsel to address the 
jury instructions once we've moved beyond this specific 
issue. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And do you want to do the jury 
instructions in the morning or do you want us to wait or come 
back (inaudible) here, or ... 
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that I need to 
24 I address this issue first because -
I ··--------------------------·--------r---
---·---··•···--•. ---•·-'.-------··--- ---··--·--·~--.---·--·-- -··· --•-
25 i 
I 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Absolutely. 
I 
I 
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THE COURT: - the - it's foundational to what the 
instructions do or don't include. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I totally agree. I mean, it may be 
that all of the - because right now, we're we've been going 
back and forth offering alternatives to each other's 
instructions that would relate to extreme emotional distress 
instruction and defense, and we haven't reached an agreement. 
Were you to argue - or were you to conclude that this - none 
of this evidence is admissible - let me just put on the 
record - it may be better just to skip that entirely. So, I 
agree that we need to let - give you time to do your legal 
review prior to doing instructions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's have us reconvene tomorrow 
morning at 8:30. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: 8:30 is fine. 
MR. BOEHM: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. RICKS: Thank you, Judge. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BOEHM: I would just make the record that the 
State has not rested, that Detective Reyes, who took the 
stand, is not yet released, but he's released at least for 
23 the time being. 
24 THE COURT: Just for today. 
-------i- ... ······-----··-· 
25 MR. BOEHM: Yes. 
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THE COCRT: Correct. 
MR. BOEHM: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. And if counsel 
have any brief written argument that you wish to submit, get 
it to me by tomorrow -
MR. BOEHM: I (inaudible) - I apologize. 
THE COURT: If you have any brief written argument 
that you wish to submit on any of these grounds - well, I -
submit whatever argument you wish to make. I'm not going to 
limit you to a brief argument. I'm going to ask you to 
submit whatever you have. 
MR. BOEHM: May I ask - I'm still getting used to 
this E-filing system, and it's led to a couple problems on my 
part -
THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
MR. BOEHM: The Court isn't asking me to E-file 
something, I hope. Can I just bring it in and print it? 
THE COURT: Just bring it in to me. 
MR. BOEHM: Okay, thank you. 
MR. ?: Your Honor, would you like him here at 8:30? 
THE COURT: I believe he needs to be - he - counsel? 
22 1 Do you wish to have Mr. Sanchez here while we're discussing 
23 jury instructions? 
24 MR. DELLAPIANA: We don't care (inaudible) - we need 
'·-·-------·----·---·-------------+--
25 to talk to him now -
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MR. RICKS: We do. We'd need to talk to him right 
now and we'll make that decision. There's some things we 
need to discuss with him (inaudible} -
THE COURT: Okay, the question is, when do we want 
Mr. Sanchez back tomorrow morning? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Let's have him here, just to be 
sure, yeah, that's a good -
MR. ?: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the trial was continued} 
-c-
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JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning. I'll be right back. 
Excuse me, gentlemen. Thank you. 
Gentlemen, I am way too old to be pulling up all-
nighters which is what I had to do last night. All right. 
Let - we have various things that I need to rule on. We are 
on the record on the matter of State of Utah versus James 
Raphael Sanchez, case number 111903659. Let me get myself 
organized here. All right. I see that there is ... 
Okay. I want to address first the motion for 
mistrial. Having fully considered Mr. Sanchez's arguments, I 
deny the motion. A mistrial is not required where an 
improper statement was not intentionally elicited, was made 
in passing, and in the context of all the testimony 
presented, is relatively innocuous. And there I'm relying on 
State versus Allen, 103 P 3 rd - I'm sorry, 108 P 3 rd 730, with 
21 a pinpoint at 738 -
I 
l 
22 ! MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, before you go into your 
I
I 
23 analysis, there was - we didn't really make part of our 
24 I record about our argument for the mistrial, and it's not on 
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l bench, but I'd like to say one thing about the juror's note 
2 ! because I don't think we put that on record when we were 
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arguing previously for the mistrial. This will only take a 
minute, if I may. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: We did - I think the last time we 
argued, it was after we came back from lunch yesterday, and 
8 i we brought up the fact that we had got notice of a headline 
9 l where they said it - accused says, ur think I might've killed 
10 her this time." The Court made a - I think a reasonable 
11 · assertion that just because the media picked up on that, 
12 1 didn't mean that the jury picked up on it. And I thought, 
13 well, perhaps that's true, at least until we got the 
14 i subsequent question from the jury, which was, as I recall, to 
15 1 the effect, has the defendant assaulted her before, or 
16 something to that effect. And then, I think we knew, I think 
17 I without any doubt at all, that the matter was not overlooked 
18 ! by the jury, and I think considered together with the prior 
19 ! inadmissible evidence that came in, shows that there's a 
20 strong probability of prejudice to the defendant in this 
21 case. That's all. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. BOEHM: May I -
THE COURT: l respectfully disagree. 
MR. BOEHM: And may I respond just (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: You may respond. 
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' MR. BOEHM: The question that was asked by the jury 
2 about any prior assaults wasn't asked yesterday - or excuse 
3 me, it wasn't asked on Tuesday when the concerning testimony 
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was elicited. It wasn't asked of the witness who gave the 
concerning testimony. It was asked yesterday on Wednesday 
during Detective Reyes - at the close of Detective Reyes' 
testimony. And I think it was specific to whether Detective 
Reyes himself knew of anything, and the Court instructed them 
that that was not proper, that couldn't come in. The fact 
that he was asking Detective Reyes means he may want to know 
if there was something, but he didn't know. And the fact 
12 that he doesn't know means that there's nothing for them to 
13 consider. 
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THE COURT: And I think Mr. Boehm has summarized it 
just, probably better than I would have. The basis for why I 
don't believe that the note from the juror that arose at the 
near conclusion of Detective Reyes's testimony, in any way, 
could be considered to relate back to the statement made by 
the - effectively the first or second witness in this case. 
In - I've looked at State versus Walk, I've looked 
at State versus Decorso, in all of these the court declined 
to grant mistrials when witnesses made improper references to 
23 i crimes that the defendant had allegedly committed, and in 
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didn't he tell you that, I think I might have killed her? 
That's a question that simply required a yes or no answer. 
At that point Mr. Warner then, you know, volunteered the 
statement that added the - at this - you know, uthis time.n 
The statement, as has been noted, the jury thereafter, at the 
conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Warner, was given the 
opportunity to ask questions of Mr. Warner. In no way was 
there any question that was - that picked up or responded to 
any suggestion that arguably could've come from that 
volunteered statement. It seems to me that if the issue had 
been present in the minds of the jury, that would've been the 
time when that question would've been expected, not at the 
conclusion of the State's case a day later. 
Additionally, I must consider the totality of the 
evidence that has been admitted, including most notably the 
extensive admissions by the defendant himself. Considering 
that the statement was made in passing, it was not dwelt upon 
by either counsel or the Court, the matter moved on, and when 
compared to the totality of the evidence, it is - if it was 
error, it was at best harmless error. 
Now, the defense has sought to introduce, through 
the testimony of Detective Reyes, evidence regarding certain 
statements made by the defendant, I am understanding, or I'm 
assuming, for the purpose of establishing a basis for 
asserting the special mitigation defense of extreme emotional 
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distress. Specifically, the defense wishes to introduce 
statements either allegedly made by the victim, either 
admitting or suggesting that she'd been involved sexually 
with the defendant's brother, and/or defendant's own 
statements of his belief that the victim was having sexual 
relations with his brother. The defense counsel has offered 
various alternative grounds for why that testimony should be 
heard by the jury. Specifically, the defense contends that 
failure to allow that evidence violates the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause, that the testimony is admissible under 
the Rule of Completeness and/or Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, under some unspecified rule, which I understood to 
be 608C, to show bias on the detective's part; as a non-
hearsay statement under 801C2, because it's not being offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, or as hearsay that 
falls within the then existing state of mind exception under 
Rule 803-3. 
I have considered each of these grounds separately, 
and I conclude that none of them form a basis for allowing 
introduction of that testimony. In making that 
consideration, I have read all of the cases that were cited 
by the defense and provided to me, as well as my own 
research. 
With respect to the Sixth Amendment argument, the 
Confrontation Clause speaks to the defendant's right to be 
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confronted with witnesses against him. To the extent he is 
seeking to elicit his own exculpatory statements through the 
detective, on its face it is clear that his statements are 
not the statements of a witness against him. To the extent 
that he's seeking to elicit statements he attributes to the 
decedent, they would at best be double hearsay, none of which 
falls under an exception was cited. At worst, he would be 
unable to benefit from the victim's unavailability, that by 
his own admission he created, and the alleged statements 
would not fall within any of the exceptions to Rule 804. 
As to his arguments about - based on the - it was 
originally cited as the Rule of Completeness. But I will 
discuss it under both Rrule of Completeness and 106, because 
the defense subsequently submitted a document making a case 
under 106. The Rule of Completeness is a common law rule. 
Our Supreme Court has held that, where the oral - and it's a 
strictly oral statement, it's not been reduced to writing, 
the Rule of Completeness may apply under Rule 611. That was 
not argued to the Court. And certainly no analysis has been 
20 put forward with respect to Rule 611. But, in any event, the 
21 
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Rule of Completeness does not apply in a case like this one 
where, what we have at issue, is the defendant's 
contemporaneously recorded interview, which was then 
transcribed, and in State versus Leleae, I'm not pronouncing 
that correctly, but it's L-E-L-E-A-E, 993 P 3 rd 232. In that 
6 
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case, the - a detective conducted an interview with the 
defendant. The defendant's statements were tape recorded and 
then transcribed. At trial, the defendant's statements 
against interest were introduced through the detective. The 
5 court found that, although the defendant's oral statement was 
6 1 introduced through the detective, the statements were 
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recorded and transcribed, and Rule 106 applied - actually, 
were sought to be introduced. The appellate court upheld the 
denial of the defense's motion to introduce the entire 
statement of the defendant for the purpose of, quote, 
"putting the prosecution's requested portion in context.n 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not abused 
its discretion, and decided that this statement should be 
included - excluded. 
In this case, as in that - and that one, the 
defendant's oral statement during his interview with 
Detective Reyes was recorded and transcribed. As such, they 
fall within 106, and not under the Rule of Completeness 
19 referenced by the defense in its argument initially. Under 
20 106, the Court must apply a fairness standard in evaluating 
21 the need for admitting the remainder of a written or recorded 
statement. And under that standard, the court needs to admit 
only those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify, 
22 
23 
24 explain, or place into context the portion that has already 1 
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1 statements that are essentially a self-serving, after-the-
2 I fact explanation for his conduct in assaulting the victim, 
3 I and that portion of that overall interview was temporally 
4 removed from the inculpatory statements that had been 
5 i received without objection on the basis of 801-B-2. 
6 I conclude that the fairness analysis does not 
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require the admission of the statements offered to explain 
the reasons for his brutal assault on the victim. 
Now, initially the defense cited State versus Cruz 
Meza in support of his claim that the statement should be 
received. I disagree. In Cruz Meza, the defendant confessed 
of his murder to a third person, which was an oral statement. 
There the trial court analyzed it essentially under the 
common law rule and excluded it on the basis that the 
statements were not made spontaneously, and lacked the 
indicia of trustworthiness or reliability. The Supreme Court 
17 l upheld the trial court's exercise of its discretion. 
18 I In any event, I believe Cruz Meza is 
19 
20 
distinguishable, because the statement at issue was a 
strictly oral statement, and the admissibility analysis was 
21 made under the common law Rule of Completeness, not under 
22 103, which the defense has now made clear it is - that is the 
23 ! sole basis that it is proceeding under. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: You mean 106? Or -
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Oh. 
THE COURT: I mis-spoke. 
Now, I will note that that last analysis or 
statement submitted by the defense was done as, quote, a 
5 reply to the State's motion in limine. I remind counsel that 
6 
7 
I had stricken the State's motion, and had not considered the 
motion in limine because it had been untimely filed. So 
8 there really was nothing to reply to. But, I had invited 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
counsel to submit any additional briefing, which the State 
has now provided, and which the defense provided to me 
yesterday evening. 
I also find no merit in the argument that the 
defendant's statement must be received presumably under Rule 
14 608C to show the detective's alleged bias. The defense has 
15 certainly not pointed to any specific facts that would 
16 support or show that Detective Reyes's testimony was simply 
17 factually reported on the defendant's inculpatory statements, 
18 
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is in any way tainted by bias. The detective's testimony was 
nothing more than a straightforward response to questions put 
to him by both the prosecution and the defense. 
I similarly reject their claim that the statement 
is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, 
and therefore it's not hearsay. If the defendant's 
explanatory statement is, in fact, not being offered for the 
-----·-··--·-··--······-·· .. -·-••··-•-··---··-•·-••·--···-·-··-···-·--·-···----···--········-·-•--·---
truth of the matter asserted, then the defense has failed to 
9 
. ..:;) 
-.d 
·..d 
-..J 
.-.t) 
.,) 
. .J 
.d 
J 
. .) 
4 
1 ! articulate its relevance. And, as such, under Rule 402, 
2 I irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 
3 I Finally, the defense asserts that the statements 
~ are admissible under the hearsay exception to Rule 803-3 as 
5 i evidence of the defendant's motive for acting as he did and 
6 ! assaulting the victim. I will admit that this one was a much 
7 , closer call. In State v. (inaudible), 780 P 2nd 1221, the 
8 defendant challenged the admission of his hearsay statement, 
9 I that if his wife ever left him he would kill her. The Utah 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Supreme Court held that the trial court had not erred in 
admitting the statement, because it was relevant to the - and 
the statement certainly reflected the defendant's mental 
state, and the jury could infer his intent to murder his wife 
based on that statement. And, in that case, the court did 
state the rule that hearsay evidence that shows the 
defendant's mental state prior to the commission of a er ~·_me 
17 is admissible under 803-3, if the statement was made under 
18 l circumstances that indicate its reliability, and is relevant 
19 to show intent, planned motive, when the State's 
20 defendant's state of mind is at issue in the case, or is 
21: relevant to prove or explain acts or conducts of the 
22 defendant. Notably, the statement at issue in Debello was an 
23 inculpatory statement that arguably could've also come in 
24 under Rule 801-0-2 as a non-hearsay statement being offered 
---•-•-- ··-·-· - ·- -• •----. 
25 against a party opponent. 
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Similarly, in State versus Auble, 754 P 2 r.d 935, 
the court admitted under Rule 803-3 that hearsay statements 
of the decedent to a third party shortly before her death to 
the effect that the defendant had threatened her life. The 
5 court held those statements were admissible as evidence of 
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the decedent's state of mine. In doing so, the state relied 
on State versus Wauneka - Wauneka - I'm not sure how to spell 
it - it's W-A-U-N-E-K-A, 560 P 2~d 13677, where the court 
generally enunciated rules of admissibility of out of court 
statements made by a homicide victim who reported threat~, of 
death or serious bodily injury made by the defendant. 
In this case, the defendant is seeking to admit his 
arguably exculpatory or self-serving statement on the basis 
that it is relevant to show his motive or to explain his 
conduct. Even if this were true, however, the defendant has 
failed to meet the first part of the Debello test, which is 
that he has failed to show that the statement was made under 
circumstances that indicate its reliability and 
trustworthiness. 
More recently, in State versus Marchette, the 
defense sought to introduce under 803-3 hearsay exculpatory 
statements that he had made in a phone call to a victim of 
sexual assault in that case. The investigating detectiv12 had 
set up a scripted, recorded, pretext call between the 
- -········-····-• ............... ---·-·-··------·------
25 defendant and the victim, and his statements during that call 
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1 demonstrated his belief that the victim had consented. 
2 Marchette's statements in that recorded telephone call were 
3 made several days after the charged event occurred, and the 
4 court concluded did not amount to evidence of his state of 
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mind as it existed during his encounter with the victim. 
trial court declined to admit the inculpatory statement as 
inadmissible hearsay, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The 
In this case, although the defendant's exclamatory 
statement was made the day following the event at issue, 
rather than several days later, that by itself does not 
reassure the Court of the trustworthiness of the statement, 
and the defendant has not offered anything to support the 
conclusion that the statement is trustworthy. Rather, as I 
have already indicated, the statement is an after-the-fact 
explanation that seeks to minimize his culpability for his 
admitted conduct towards the victim. Thus, although the 
Supreme Court has recognized situations under which certain 
hearsay statements that reflect state of mind are properly 
admissible, the Court concludes that this is not one of those 
20 situations. 
21 Finally, even though I'm not accepting any of the 
22 
23 
grounds that have been proffered by the defense for 
admissibility of the testimony, I'm not sure that the defense 
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it would certainly open the door for the defense - for the 
prosecution to then put on all the evidence of the 
defendant's prior convictions for his assaultive behavior on 
the very same victim just a few weeks prior, which would've 
totally undercut his emotional - extreme emotional distress 
defense - special mitigation, that this was an out of 
character, extreme, overwrought, emotional response to a 
triggering event. But, since I'm denying it, we don't need 
to even go there. 
Given that conclusion, however, I do not need to 
address jury instructions having to do with extreme emotional 
distress because, at this point - and I will invite Mr. 
Dellapiana to make a record of this - I am not persuaded that 
there is sufficient cognizable evidence to present that 
defense to a jury. But I would certainly invite Mr. 
Dellapiana, if he believes that he wants to make a record of 
what evidence he believes - cognizable, admissible evidence, 
that is already a matter of record, that would allow this 
matter to go to the jury, you're welcome to make that record. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Your Honor, based on your rulings, 
there is none. I don't think that without that evidence, the 
defense has a basis to argue special mitigation. 
THE COURT: All right. So now -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I do have an alternative defense 
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I'd like to file a requested instruction for, however. 
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